William & Mary Law Review
Volume 63 (2021-2022)
Issue 3

Article 4

2-2022

Recovering the Lost General Welfare Clause
David S. Schwartz

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Repository Citation
David S. Schwartz, Recovering the Lost General Welfare Clause, 63 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 857
(2022), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol63/iss3/4
Copyright c 2022 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

RECOVERING THE LOST GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE

DAVID S. SCHWARTZ*
ABSTRACT
The General Welfare Clause of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the
Constitution enumerates a power to “provide for the common defense
and general welfare.” A literal interpretation of this clause (“the
general welfare interpretation”) would authorize Congress to legislate
for any national purpose, and therefore to address all national problems—for example, the COVID-19 pandemic—in ways that would be
precluded under the prevailing understanding of limited enumerated
powers. But conventional doctrine rejects the general welfare
interpretation and construes the General Welfare Clause to confer the
so-called “Spending Power,” a power only to spend, but not to
regulate, for national purposes.
This Article argues that both the text and the drafting history of
the General Welfare Clause support reading it as a power to regulate
on all national problems, such as environmental degradation,
violence against women, and pandemic disease. It is only our superficial ideological commitment to enumerationism—the doctrine of
limited enumerated powers—that causes us to depart from the most
evident textual interpretation of the General Welfare Clause.
Recovering the lost General Welfare Clause is particularly important
at this moment in constitutional history, when a conservative and
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Dan Tokaji, Nina Varsava, Bill Whitford, and Rob Yablon. Invaluable research assistance was
provided by Nancy Cruz, Nathan Kuenzi, Alyssa LeRoy, Mitchell Philbin, Olivia Radics, and,
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supposedly originalist Supreme Court is poised to greatly constrict
federal power to respond to pressing national problems in service of
a tendentious and badly one-sided account of Founding Era views
on federalism.
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INTRODUCTION
Does the Constitution empower Congress to issue a nationwide
mask mandate in response to the COVID-19 pandemic? To require
individuals to take steps to prevent further environmental degradation? To redress a nationwide pattern of violence against women?
The answers to these questions are “no” or “probably not,” according
to the questionable ideology of “enumerationism”—the idea that the
Constitution confers only limited enumerated powers on the
national government and thereby denies the power to address all
national problems.1 Yet these important disputes about the delegated powers of Congress would not even arise under an arguably
correct reading of the General Welfare Clause of Article I, Section
8, Clause 1 (Clause 1): “to ... provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare.”2 Such a reading—which I refer to as the “general
welfare interpretation” of the General Welfare Clause—would
authorize the federal government to legislate on all national
problems. This interpretation is hardly far-fetched. According to
James Madison, interpreting the General Welfare Clause to “convey
the comprehensive power” to legislate on all national matters gives
those words the meaning “which taken literally they express.”3

1. On enumerationism, see, e.g., John Mikhail, Fixing Implied Constitutional Powers in
the Founding Era, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 507, 510-13 (2019) (reviewing JONATHAN GIENAPP,
THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (2018));
Jonathan Gienapp, The Myth of the Constitutional Given: Enumeration and National Power
at the Founding, 69 AM. U. L. REV. F. 183, 183-89 (2020); Richard Primus, Reframing Article
I, Section 8, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2003, 2003-06, 2009-11, 2018 (2021); David S. Schwartz, A
Question Perpetually Arising: Implied Powers, Capable Federalism, and the Limits of
Enumerationism, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 573, 581-82 (2017) (originating and defining the term
“enumerationism”); see also Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1-2, 6, 12 (2010)
(arguing that the original meaning of the Commerce Clause was to function as a broad, national legislative authorization); Robert J. Reinstein, The Aggregate and Implied Powers of
the United States, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 3, 3-4, 7-8 (2019) (questioning limited enumerated powers). For an excellent earlier example of scholarship on this theme, see Calvin H. Johnson,
The Dubious Enumerated Power Doctrine, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 25, 27 (2005).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
3. James Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 411, 417 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) [hereinafter Madison to Stevenson].
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Nevertheless, the settled interpretation departs from this literal
meaning of the text. Clause 1 as a whole provides as follows, with
the General Welfare Clause italicized:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States.4

Conventional doctrine maintains that Clause 1 enumerates the
taxing and spending powers, and that the words “to ... provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare” constitute the “Spending
Clause”—conferring a power to spend, but not to regulate, for
national purposes.5 Yet “provide for” is not the most natural way to
express the idea of spending; the more obvious interpretation of that
phrase is to “legislate” or “regulate,” which is how “provide for” is
used elsewhere in the Constitution.6 Moreover, the most closely
applicable canons of construction favor the general welfare interpretation. Nevertheless, the linguistically strained “spending power”
interpretation is presumed to be textually correct, whereas the
general welfare interpretation—despite being a more natural reading—is viewed as “manifestly erroneous.”7
This Article argues that the text and drafting history of the
General Welfare Clause favor the general welfare interpretation.
The prevailing view, that the narrow spending power interpretation is textually mandated, is wrong. On the contrary, the literal
words and applicable canons of construction favor the general welfare interpretation over narrower ones. Further, the drafting history
of Clause 1 demonstrates that the Framers intended to favor the
general welfare interpretation, albeit by adopting strategically
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
5. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 576 (2012); South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 296-99 (6th ed. 2019); Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities
and Originalism: Lessons from the Spending Power, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 495, 511, 516-19
(2009). But see Johnson, supra note 1, at 27 (arguing that interpreting the General Welfare
Clause as a plenary legislative authorization is “[t]he best reading of the Constitution”).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 82-89.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 17-22.
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ambiguous language that also left space for a narrower interpretation.
This argument casts doubt on enumerationism itself. The general
welfare interpretation of the General Welfare Clause truly is incompatible with the doctrine of limited enumerated powers. That
doctrine has long and widely been held to be an inexorable textual
command.8 By showing that the text and drafting history of the
General Welfare Clause favor the general welfare interpretation, I
do not claim to refute enumerationism. But I do claim to undermine
the contention that enumerationism is compelled by the Constitution’s text or the intentions of its Framers. As we will see, the
assumption of limited enumerated powers does all the analytical
work that underlies the longstanding rejection of the general welfare interpretation. Whether normatively justified or not, it is our
ideological commitment to enumerationism that makes the general
welfare interpretation seem outlandish.
The interpretive stakes of this argument are to clarify and expand
the newly reopened Founding Era debate about whether the Constitution is best read as granting limited enumerated powers to the
federal government, or instead as empowering it to address all
national problems. If, as I contend, the text and Framers’ intentions
favor the anti-enumerationist, general welfare interpretation of the
General Welfare Clause, then enumerationism can no longer rest on
textual and intent-based arguments. It must instead rely on nonoriginalist arguments from history, precedent, or the Constitution’s
“spirit” to compete with a general welfare theory of federal powers.
I believe that the general welfare interpretation is not only textually and historically plausible; it is normatively superior. A fully
presented normative case for the general welfare interpretation
requires addressing various normative arguments of different
modalities. But what most of these interpretive modalities have in
common is their belief that the Framers’ intent is highly probative,
if not dispositive, in interpreting constitutional text. This is true
even of the interpretive theory that purports to mount the most
damning critique of interpretations that rely on Framers’ intent:
“original public meaning” originalism. Accordingly, any normative
argument for the general welfare interpretation stumbles out of the
8. See, e.g., NFIB, 567 U.S. at 533-34.
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gate unless it can counter the predictable objection that of course
the general welfare interpretation is foreclosed because the Framers
intended to confer limited enumerated powers, and not general
ones—not even general powers limited to national rather than local
problems. This Article meets and rebuts that threshold objection,
thereby taking the first large step toward a normative theory, by
showing that the text and drafting history of the General Welfare
Clause support the general welfare interpretation.
In Part I, I expand on the interpretive stakes of my argument by
describing the cost of enumeration. That doctrine requires that we
tolerate constitutional prohibitions on the federal government’s authority to address at least some national problems—a unified and
comprehensive pandemic response being a salient example. I then
explain how the drafting history of ambiguous constitutional text is
a highly relevant consideration in any mainstream approach to
constitutional interpretation, including “original public meaning”
originalism.
In Part II, I focus on the text of Clause 1. Although that clause
can be parsed in four different ways, none of those achieves a
compelling victory over the general welfare interpretation of the
General Welfare Clause—whether construing the literal language
of Clause 1 or applying interpretive canons to vary the prima facie
language. It is only our confirmation bias, the tendency to interpret
evidence to confirm existing beliefs, that prevents us from seeing
the plausibility of the general welfare interpretation. That confirmation bias stems from the entrenchment of enumerationism.
In Part III, I detail the drafting history of the General Welfare
Clause within Clause 1. Although this drafting history has been hiding in plain sight ever since publication of Madison’s Convention
notes in 1840,9 it has been completely overlooked by historians and
constitutional scholars. This may be due in large part to Madison
himself, who “loathed” the General Welfare Clause and was largely
successful in his lifelong effort to sweep it under the rug.10 The
9. See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CON236-37 (2015).
10. See DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN
LEGACY 77 (1989); David S. Schwartz, Mr. Madison’s War on the General Welfare Clause, 1226 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing Madison’s campaign against the
general welfare interpretation).
VENTION
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General Welfare Clause first appeared as a proposal in the Committee of Detail’s lesser-known second report presented two weeks after
its famous first report of August 6, 1787, which produced the first
draft of the Constitution.11 In that second report on August 22, 1787,
the Committee proposed a General Welfare Clause that unambiguously authorized Congress to legislate for “the ... general interests
and welfare of the United States.”12 It was to be located at the end
of the Necessary and Proper Clause—a placement that would have
left little doubt that it was intended as a broad grant of legislative
power.13 Over the next two weeks, that language was ambiguated
and relocated to its final placement, at the end of Article I, Section
8, Clause 1.14
In Part IV, I analyze the drafting history to draw inferences explaining the Framers’ intentions behind Clause 1. This history
strongly suggests a compromise between a nationalist, impliedpowers bloc and a state-centered, limited-enumerated-powers bloc
at the Convention.15 The “enumerationists,” as I call them, successfully bargained for strategically ambiguous language in the final
version, language that made interpretive space for a narrow reading
of Clause 1.16 Despite the ambiguity, however, the nationalists were
11. See infra text accompanying notes 210-13.
12. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 367 (Max Farrand ed.
1911, rec. ed. 1937) [hereinafter 2 FARRAND] (Journal). Citations to FARRAND in this Article
will identify the source of the document by the name of the delegate whose private notes are
cited (for example, “Madison,” “McHenry”) or, where applicable, the official Convention “Journal.” This practice seems worthwhile in light of the research of Professor Mary Bilder, who
has shown that the Journal is more reliable, and Madison’s notes are less reliable, than traditionally believed. See BILDER, supra note 9 passim; Mary Sarah Bilder, How Bad Were the
Official Records of the Federal Convention?, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1620 passim (2012).
13. See CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 599-600 (1928) (explaining
that the Clause “would have given to Congress practically unrestricted scope of legislation”).
Warren, one of only two scholars even to notice this proposed amendment, cursorily dismissed
its significance in one sentence. See id.
14. See infra Part III.E.
15. See Mikhail, supra note 1, at 510-16.
16. The Framers resorted to strategic ambiguity in several places in drafting the
Constitution. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 24-26 (2011) (arguing that the
Framers used general, abstract, or open-ended constitutional provisions to accommodate
“conflicting interests and values” that “would be left to future generations to work out”
through constitutional politics). See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Strategic Ambiguity and
Article VII’s Two-Stage Ratification Process: Why the Framers (Should Have) Decided Not to
Decide (N.Y.U. Sch. L. L. & Econ. Rsch. Working Paper, Paper No. 19-43, 2019), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3454955 [https://perma.cc/K7S7-WQ9L].
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successful in retaining language whose most plausible, literal interpretation authorized the national government to legislate on all
national problems. The “spending power” interpretation that prevails today has no basis in the Framers’ intentions, but rather
emerges from post-ratification developments. I conclude by dispensing with some of the weak style-based arguments that present-day
scholars rely on to dismiss the plausibility of the general welfare
interpretation. As with other textual arguments, it is only our
confirmation bias that makes these extremely thin arguments seem
dispositive.
Today, we face pressing nationwide problems that fall outside the
conventionally understood limited enumerated powers—such as
environmental degradation, national healthcare, and the COVID-19
pandemic. At the same time, a conservative and purportedly originalist Supreme Court is poised to greatly constrict federal power to
respond to these problems, in service of a tendentious and badly
one-sided account of Founding Era views on federal legislative
power. The stakes of this interpretive question may be higher than
ever.
I. THE INTERPRETIVE STAKES
Contrary to the weight of the evidence, the General Welfare
Clause is not given the general welfare interpretation, “which taken
literally [its words] express.”17 The general welfare interpretation is
never considered by courts and is brushed aside by the few scholars
who notice it. Constitutional historian Charles Warren announced
a century ago that the general welfare interpretation “has been long
demolished.”18 Recent scholars agree that the general welfare interpretation “is manifestly erroneous.”19 Lengthy histories of the
General Welfare Clause ignore it,20 as did the Supreme Court.21 One
17. Madison to Stevenson, supra note 3, at 417.
18. WARREN, supra note 13, at 476.
19. John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L.
REV. 63, 67 n.18 (2001); accord Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public
Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 11 (2003).
20. See, e.g., THEODORE SKY, TO PROVIDE FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE: A HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL SPENDING POWER 36-48 (2003); David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE
L.J. 1, 5-26 (1994).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
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scholar erases it from the history books, claiming (wrongly) that “no
one has ever been heard to make such an argument.”22
Why? The answer is an overwhelming confirmation bias. By assuming that the text and original intention of the Constitution
establish enumerationism, we render the general welfare interpretation implausible—even invisible. The general welfare interpretation violates enumerationism: if Congress has the power to legislate
on all national problems, then the idea that it can only regulate
national problems within its enumerated powers is undermined.
But, as discussed below, the original Constitution was not clearly
enumerationist—far from it.23 The first decade under the new Constitution saw interpretive struggles over the General Welfare
Clause between the general welfare interpretation of Congress’s
powers and enumerationism.24 Only after the repeated electoral
triumphs of Jeffersonian Republicanism beginning in 1800-1801 did
enumerationism become entrenched as constitutional dogma.25
Since the New Deal revolution in 1937, our constitutional order
has continued to pay lip service to enumerationism, while making
every effort to work around it. Most often, we try to shoehorn regulatory problems into the Commerce Clause.26 This development has
largely removed what might otherwise have been pressure from
constitutional politics to revisit enumerationism and the limited
interpretation of the General Welfare Clause.
Largely, but not entirely. Enumerationism retains significant
bite: cases in which the Supreme Court strikes down a law as exceeding the enumerated powers may be few and far between, but
when they occur, they are important. The Violence Against Women
Act and the Affordable Care Act (ACA) were significant laws that
ran afoul of enumerationism.27 The COVID-19 pandemic brings to
22. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 340 (1997).
23. See infra Part III.A.
24. Compare, e.g., 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1926 (1791) (statement of Rep. Elias Boudinot)
(noting that the national bank charter is an “exercise [of] power for the general welfare”), with
id. at 1898 (statement of Rep. James Madison) (noting that limited enumerated powers is
“[t]he essential characteristic” of the Constitution).
25. DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE 200YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 25 (2019).
26. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 620.
27. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012). The fact that a majority in NFIB rejected the
Commerce Clause as a basis to uphold the ACA’s “individual mandate,” arguably the lynchpin
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painful reality an example of a major national problem deeply affecting the general welfare that falls outside the conventionally
understood enumerated powers: a disease is not commerce.28 Under
the logic of United States v. Lopez29 and United States v. Morrison,30
whatever substantial effects COVID-19 has on the economy, fighting
it with health measures is not within the powers of Congress because doing so is not economic activity. Because of enumerationism,
Congress probably has the power to require the wearing of masks
in bars, restaurants, and grocery stores, but not at schools, political
rallies, or large private gatherings. In short, any acknowledgment
of a general welfare legislative power rather than limited enumerated powers may not matter often; but when it does, it matters a lot.
A. The Price of Enumerationism
The Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the past twentyfive years insists that enumerationism is essential to maintaining
“a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local” by refusing to allow Congress to wield “a general police power
of the sort retained by the States.”31 But the Court’s reasoning is
based entirely on a false dichotomy. Between the poles of limited
enumerated powers and a general police power to “perform all the
conceivable functions of government”32 lies an excluded middle
ground: limited general powers. To say that Congress can legislate
on all national problems is in fact a limited delegation of power: it
limits Congress to national problems and excludes local ones. This
is not merely a logically plausible alternative to the false dilemma
of limited-enumerated or else unlimited police powers; it is a historically grounded one. As explained further below, the Constitutional
Convention initially approved the concept of a general authorization
to address all national problems, passing a resolution that would
of the law, made the Act vulnerable to a new constitutional challenge once the Republicancontrolled Congress zeroed out the “shared responsibility” tax payment on which the 5-4 NFIB
majority had upheld the law. See id. at 574; California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2123 (2021)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
28. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 34.
29. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
30. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
31. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
32. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 534.
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have authorized Congress “to legislate in all Cases for the general
Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States
are separately incompetent.”33
But by forcing the debate over the scope of powers into the enumerationist mold, the Court needlessly obscures the real issue: the
national versus local character of a regulatory problem. Instead,
defenders of particular congressional statutes must make strained
arguments for why a particular regulatory problem involves interstate commerce. The Court has derided such arguments for “piling
inference upon inference” in a manner that makes it impossible “to
posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power
to regulate.”34 And when it comes to a mandate to do something, the
Court now directs us to engage in an inane, metaphysical debate
about a distinction between activity and inactivity.35 That contribution from National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
would undoubtedly be important in a challenge to a national mask
or vaccination mandate. But such niceties relate only indirectly, if
at all, to the real federalism question: Is the regulatory matter one
of predominantly national or local concern?
The general welfare interpretation would at once eliminate the
false dichotomy and the doctrinal failure to confront the federalism
question at the heart of the Constitution’s division of powers between the national and state governments. By interpreting “provide
for the general welfare” to mean “legislate on all national problems,”
the national-versus-local question is squarely raised. This, in turn,
has direct and vital policy implications. We would not need to worry
about creating pointless gaps in Congress’s power to deal with a
pandemic or other matters of national concern that do not fit the
enumerated pigeonholes.
Strikingly, the logic of enumerationism requires that there be national problems that Congress cannot address. This regulatory gap,
as I have called it, is not a bug or defect in constitutional design but
a defining feature of enumerationism.36 Madison essentially
conceded this point in his 1791 House speech opposing Alexander
Hamilton’s bill to charter a national bank: when a desired national
33.
34.
35.
36.

See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 21 (Journal); infra Part III.A.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 552-53.
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 589.
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power was “omitted, however necessary it might have been, the
defect could only [be] lamented, or supplied by an amendment of the
Constitution.”37 Were this design defect not present—if Congress
could regulate everything beyond the capabilities of the states—
then enumerationism would evaporate and be replaced with the
general-but-limited authorization to address all national problems.
Thus, for enumerationism to be meaningful, there must be a
regulatory gap in which one or more national problems can neither
be constitutionally addressed by the federal government nor adequately addressed by the states. Lamentably, the COVID-19
pandemic perfectly fits this regulatory gap built into enumerationism.38
While the regulatory gap is a cost of enumerationism—one that
seems to be fairly steep in the COVID-19 situation—the benefits are
elusive. The best one can say for it is that enumerationism represents a second-best way of limiting national governmental powers
on the assumption that the ideal of a general “all national problems”
authorization is too amorphous to be enforced. Yet a nationalversus-local standard is no more amorphous than most other tests
in constitutional law.39 Moreover, limited enumerated powers is not
even a second-best mode of enforcing federalism limits. It is at best
a third- or fourth-best mode.40 The Framers themselves apparently
believed that process limits on legislation—such as a two-house legislature and a presidential veto—were more effective than “parchment barriers” in the form of specified limits.41 But if paper barriers

37. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1900-01 (1791) (statement of Rep. James Madison).
38. The amendment process does not effectively neutralize our motivation to lament.
Consider the COVID-19 pandemic. The amendment process would delay needed federal response measures by months or years, assuming an amendment could be passed at all. Drew
DeSilver, Proposed Amendments to the U.S. Constitution Seldom Go Anywhere, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/12/a-look-at-proposedconstitutional-amendments-and-how-seldom-they-go-anywhere/ [https://perma.cc/Y4DR6MHG]. In the current political environment, which has turned the pandemic into a partisan
issue, it is unlikely that an amendment would be ratified at all with more than 25 percent of
the states politically “red.” See State Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 13, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisancomposition.aspx [https://perma.cc/672B-EWGG].
39. See, e.g., NFIB, 567 U.S. at 552-53.
40. See Primus, supra note 1, at 2018-28.
41. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308-09 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“[T]he efficacy of [parchment barriers] has been greatly overrated.”).
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were desirable, then a better way to protect reserved state powers
would be to enumerate limitations, rather than powers—a point
that the Framers apparently understood, for example, in enumerating limits on Congress’s powers in Article I, Section 9.42
This point is especially true when we consider the indefiniteness
of implied powers, and how even a moderately robust conception of
implied powers renders the concept of identifiable reserved state
powers untenable.43 If the goal of limited enumerated powers is to
reserve such state powers, a better approach would be the opposite
of Madison’s lament: the exercise of a federal power that should
have been left to the states “could only [be] lamented, or [expressly
reserved to the states] by an amendment of the Constitution.”44
From a design perspective, this model, coupled with a general principle that truly local matters should be left to the states seems
preferable to our limited-enumerated-powers model.
B. The Relevance of Drafting History
The role that the drafting history of an ambiguous constitutional
provision should play in that provision’s interpretation is a contentious normative question that generates several plausible answers,
depending on one’s favored interpretive theory. But that normative
question need not be answered here, because virtually all major
interpretive approaches agree that the communicative intent of the
Framers is relevant to the interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional provision and that the drafting (or “legislative”) history sheds
important light on that intent. Nor is it necessary here to assess
how much weight is given in practice to Framers’ intent and drafting history, because virtually all major interpretive theories give
significant weight to Framers’ intent.45 As a result, drafting history
is always important. Indeed, it is potentially dispositive when other
factors cancel each other out.
42. See Primus, supra note 1, at 2018-28.
43. See David S. Schwartz, McCulloch v. Maryland and the Incoherence of Enumerationism, 19 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 25, 36-37 (2021).
44. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1900-01 (1791) (statement of Rep. James Madison).
45. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683,
1685 (2012) (noting that historical intent arguments are persuasive authority in U.S. constitutional culture).
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One need not look far to find examples of reliance on drafting
history in Supreme Court decisions. There, the prevailing interpretive approach remains an eclectic blend of precedent, text, structure,
historical context, and Framers’ intent, including drafting history.46
City of Boerne v. Flores is one of dozens of examples.47 In deciding
that the Congressional Enforcement Clause in Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment restricted Congress’s power to “declare”
Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Court found it important to
compare the final text of the Fourteenth Amendment with a rejected
early draft.48 Whether their historical analysis and conclusion were
right or wrong, the Justices made clear that drafting history “confirm[ed]” the Court’s “remedial, rather than substantive, [interpretation] of the Enforcement Clause.”49
The relevance of drafting history might seem too obvious to require argument. But a simplistic understanding of the now in vogue
“original public meaning” originalism asserts that the Framers’
intent and drafting history do not matter because they were
unknown to the ratifiers, who made the proposed Constitution a
binding fundamental law. Instead, all that matters is what the
words of the Constitution were understood to mean by reasonable
ratifiers.50 On closer inspection, however, drafting history matters
even to original public meaning originalists. “The originalist interpreter,” say originalist interpreters Vasan Kesavan and Michael
Stokes Paulsen, “may infer original meaning by examining how [a]
clause was affirmatively changed from its inception to final form at
the Philadelphia Convention.”51 Indeed, virtually every original
public meaning originalist draws extensively on the drafting history
of constitutional provisions, at least when those provisions are
ambiguous or their meaning otherwise debatable.52
46. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7-8 (1982).
47. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
48. See id. at 519-24.
49. See id. at 520.
50. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599,
609-10 (2004).
51. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1204 (2003). The authors style themselves advocates of “original, objective-public-meaning textualism.” Id. at 1132-33.
52. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified
Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 47 (2018) (explaining that they consult the drafting
history and intentions of the Framers because the Framers “might have special insight into
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The ambiguity of the General Welfare Clause is sufficient to call
for a resort to drafting history. Not only does “provide” have multiple meanings, but Clause 1 parses in multiple ways, thus carrying
different connotations for the General Welfare Clause.53 We can add
a third type of semantic ambiguity to this list: pragmatic ambiguity,
which occurs when the meaning of a sentence may depart from its
literal meaning due to contextual factors.54 Madison and presentday enumerationists essentially rely on this type of ambiguity when
arguing that the General Welfare Clause should mean something
other than what its words “literally ... express.”55 Given this
ambiguity, even public meaning originalists must concede the
relevance of the drafting history of Clause 1.
II. THE TEXTUAL CASE FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE
INTERPRETATION
The General Welfare Clause has been given four textually plausible interpretations throughout U.S. constitutional history. But the
most natural reading—the one Madison found “literally ... express[ed]”—is the general welfare interpretation.56 Nothing about
the diction, syntax, structure, or textual context of Clause 1, nor
inferences from the structure of the enumerated powers as a whole,
provides a compelling basis to depart from that literal meaning and
choose one of the narrower interpretations.

the machine that they designed”); Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The
Tenth Amendment, Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1889, 1897, 1920-22 (2008) (analyzing drafting history of Tenth Amendment as part
of an inquiry into its original public meaning); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey,
The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 252, 280 (2001) (analyzing
drafting history of Article II to establish original public meaning of executive powers). Other
versions of originalism embrace the Framers’ intentions as directly controlling. See, e.g., John
O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 760 (2009) (arguing that
drafters’ intent was the dominant interpretive principle in the Founding Era).
53. See Ambiguity, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (May 22, 2021), https://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/ambiguity/#UndeSpecGene [https://perma.cc/9XQU-Z7E8] (distinguishing
types of ambiguity stemming from multiple definitions of words and multiple ways of parsing
sentences).
54. Id.
55. See Madison to Stevenson, supra note 3, at 417.
56. See id.
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A. Parsing Clause 1
Clause 1 can be parsed as a grant of one, two, or three powers.
The one-power version looks like this:
“[1] To lay and collect Taxes ... [in order] to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the
United States[.]”

This version implicitly adds words to ensure that “to” before “pay”
is not a mere infinitive, but is given its purposive definition, “in
order to.” This reading treats the pay-and-provide portion of the
clause as a constraint on the taxing power rather than a separate
grant of power.
But if we decline to add “in order” before “to,” and treat “to pay”
as a pure infinitive, then we necessarily read “to pay ... and provide”
as the grant of at least one power in addition to the taxing power.
Thus, the two-power version parses:
“[1] To lay and collect Taxes ...
[2] to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and
general Welfare of the United States[.]”

This version treats “to pay ... and provide” as a doublet in which
both terms refer synonymously to the outflow of revenue. This
parsing is most consistent with the spending power interpretation.
A spending power can also be gleaned from the three-power
version:
“[1] To lay and collect Taxes . . .
[2] to pay the Debts . . .
[3] and [to] provide for the common Defense and general Welfare
of the United States.”
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This parsing treats “to pay ... and provide” as a compound infinitive,
a construction used throughout the Constitution.57 To interpret this
parsing as a spending power requires that we read “provide” to
mean “pay” or “spend.” But if we accord significance to the verb
change (“pay” versus “provide”), we lend support to the general welfare interpretation.58 Each of these versions is plausible, and all
have been offered at one time or another.
1. The Madison and Hamilton Interpretations
Conventional doctrine has given serious consideration to only
two of the four interpretations of Clause 1: those associated with
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton.59 Both Madison and
Hamilton are said to have construed the General Welfare Clause as
a spending power.60 This interpretation fits with both the two- and
three-power versions of Clause 1, and depends on defining “provide
for” to mean “spend.”61
Madison and Hamilton, famously, differed on the scope of the
spending power. Madison argued that the “true and fair construction” of the General Welfare Clause, “too obvious to be mistaken,”
is that the clause authorized spending, but only within the confines
of the other enumerated powers.62 “Congress is authorized to
provide money for the common defence and general welfare,”
Madison acknowledged.63 But “[m]oney cannot be applied to the
general welfare, otherwise than by an application of it to some
particular measure conducive to the general welfare,” and such
“particular measure[s]” were those defined and limited by the
“enumeration of the cases to which their powers shall extend” in
Clauses 2 through 18 of Article I, Section 8.64 Were it otherwise,
Madison argued, Congress could effectively regulate outside of its
57. See infra Part IV.D.3.
58. Cf. Natelson, supra note 19, at 15 (suggesting that “pay” and “provide” should not be
interpreted as synonyms).
59. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
60. See id.
61. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 596-97.
62. James Madison, Report on the Resolutions, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
341, 356-57 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) [hereinafter Madison, Virginia Report].
63. Id. at 357.
64. Id.
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enumerated powers, rendering the enumeration mere surplusage.65
Hamilton, in contrast, argued that the power to spend money is
“plenary, and indefinite” so long as “the object to which an appropriation of money is to be made be General and not local; its operation
extending in fact, or by possibility, throughout the Union, and not
being confined to a particular spot.”66 Neither the Madisonian nor
Hamiltonian interpretations construed the General Welfare Clause
as a purpose limitation on the taxing power by reading an implicit
“in order” in front of “to pay.”
Despite the far-reaching influence of Madison’s lifelong argument
against the general welfare interpretation,67 his ultimate interpretation of Clause 1 was rejected by all three branches of government.
From the Monroe administration on, most presidents and congresses agreed that Congress could spend (noncoercively) for national
purposes, thereby adopting a noncoercive or nonregulatory version
of Hamilton’s interpretation.68 The Supreme Court finally weighed
in on this debate in United States v. Butler, approving this longstanding consensus, but with little analysis.69
Both Madison’s and Hamilton’s interpretations have significant
difficulties. Both their interpretations depend on interpreting “provide for” to mean “spend,” a definition omitted from most dictionaries and at best inferable from other meanings.70 Further, in arguing
against Hamilton’s interpretation, Madison asserted that there is
not “a power of any magnitude, which, in its exercise, does not
involve or admit an application of money.”71 In other words, a power
to spend is implicit in every grant of power. This means that
65. See id. at 356-57; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 41, at 263 (James
Madison).
66. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of the Report on the Subject of Manufactures (Dec.
5, 1791), in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230, 303 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1966).
67. See Madison to Stevenson, supra note 3, at 417-18; THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note
41, at 263 (James Madison); James Madison, Veto Message, in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789-1902, at 584 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897)
[hereinafter Bonus Bill veto].
68. How spending became conceptualized as noncoercive is an important story in itself,
one that I pursue elsewhere. See generally David S. Schwartz, The General Welfare Clause
and the Origins of the Non-Coercive Spending Power (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
69. 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
70. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
71. Madison, Virginia Report, supra note 62, at 356.
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Madison’s interpretation would render the General Welfare Clause
as mere surplusage, in violation of the very rule he used to support
his interpretation in Federalist 41.72 Finally, both Madison’s and
Hamilton’s interpretations rely heavily and circularly on the two
overlapping premises previously mentioned: that the enumeration
was intended to be exhaustive and that a “general welfare” interpretation would render the enumeration meaningless. These points will
be discussed below.73
2. The Jeffersonian Interpretation
According to Thomas Jefferson, in his memorandum urging President Washington to veto the bill to incorporate the Bank of the
United States, Clause 1 granted only a power to tax.74 The rest of
Clause 1 prior to the semicolon specified the purposes for which federal taxes could be raised.75 Congress, Jefferson argued,
are not to lay taxes ad libitum for any purpose they please; but
only to pay the debts or provide for the welfare of the Union. In
like manner they are not to do anything they please to provide
for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose.76

To Jefferson, then, the General Welfare Clause was not a grant of
power, not even to spend; it was nothing more or less than a
limitation on the taxing power.77 Jefferson seemed unconcerned to
articulate a textual basis for a federal power to spend money.
This interpretation supposes that all taxes will be earmarked for
specific national purposes, a requirement that is a practical nearimpossibility under a general revenue-raising system. It would also
generate constitutional challenges to most taxes on the ground that
they favored particular states or regions and were thus not truly for
the “general welfare.” Undoubtedly, hamstringing the federal
government in this way was Jefferson’s goal, and for this reason,
72. Id. at 356-57; accord THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 41, at 263 (James Madison).
73. See infra Part II.B.
74. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a
National Bank, in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275, 277 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974).
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
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Jefferson’s interpretation has had no purchase since the antebellum
era.78 However, as we will see, this was the interpretation that Constitutional Convention delegate Roger Sherman hoped to make
possible by bargaining for strategic ambiguity.79
3. The General Welfare Interpretation
On the other end of the spectrum, Federalists in Congress
throughout the 1790s interpreted the General Welfare Clause in
exactly the way Jefferson and Madison opposed: as a general authorization to legislate on all national concerns.80 While Federalists
downplayed this view during ratification, Antifederalists were
aware that the general welfare interpretation was lurking in the
background and tried to foreground it, hoping that its breadth
would shock the public and derail ratification.81
As Madison noted, the general welfare interpretation is the most
natural—“literal[ ]”—interpretation of the language of the General
Welfare Clause.82 “Spend” is omitted and at most only inferable from
Founding-Era dictionary definitions of “provide.”83 More importantly, the phrase “provide for” primarily means to “take care of

78. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 564 (2012)
(stating that taxes need only “produce[ ] ... some revenue”); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.
(Child Lab. Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922) (holding that taxing for general revenue is
constitutional). Unsurprisingly, Jefferson’s interpretation now appeals to libertarian originalists. See Natelson, supra note 19, at 19 (arguing to revive it).
79. See infra Part IV.A.1-2.
80. See, e.g., 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1926 (1791) (statement of Elias Boudinot) (“[W]ho so
proper as the Legislature of the whole Union to exercise such a power for the general welfare?
It has also been said that this power is a mere conveniency for the purpose of fiscal transactions, but not necessary to attain the ends proposed in the Constitution. This is denied, and
at best is mere matter of opinion, and must be left to the discretion of the Legislature to determine.”); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1959 (1798) (statement of Harrison Gray Otis) (“If Congress have
not the power of restraining seditious persons, it is extremely clear they have not the power
which the Constitution says they have, of providing for the common defence and general
welfare of the Union.”).
81. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 41, at 262-64 (James Madison) (arguing
against the antifederalist interpretation); JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 87-95 (2018) (describing the
“dangerous clauses” identified by Antifederalists); Mikhail, supra note 1, at 510-12.
82. Madison to Stevenson, supra note 3, at 417.
83. See, e.g., To Provide, SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th
ed. 1785); Provide, NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828).
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beforehand.”84 In the context of delegating a legislative power, this
most naturally means “to legislate.” Significantly, none of the eight
other uses of “provide” in the Constitution are limited to spending.85
By itself, “provide” could mean “to furnish or supply,”86 but “provide
for” is different. “Provide for” could certainly include spending, but
that usage naturally contemplates regulation as well. Consider the
similarity between “provide for” and “establish,” as in “establish
Post Offices.”87 Obviously, this never meant merely to “furnish” or
build post offices, but included a regulatory apparatus.88 In contrast,
when the Framers spoke of spending as such, they more typically
used the verb “appropriate” or the noun “appropriation,” both in the
Constitution itself and elsewhere.89
Undoubtedly, Clause 1 could have been drafted more clearly to
establish a general welfare legislative power, but the other interpretations make debatable interpretive moves to overcome similar
ambiguities. The Jeffersonian interpretation could have been made
clear simply by replacing “to” with “for purposes of,” or “in order
to”—a proposal that was in fact made and overwhelmingly rejected
at the Convention.90 The spending power interpretations of Madison
84. See, e.g., To Provide for, JOHNSON, supra note 83; Natelson, supra note 19, at 15
(defining “provide for” as “to see to in advance”).
85. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 8, cls. 6, 13, 15, 16; id. art. II, § 1,
cl. 6; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see Schwartz, supra note 1, at 596; Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 791-92 (1999) (arguing that Constitution can be a
dictionary of its own meaning).
86. See, e.g., To Provide, JOHNSON, supra note 83 (second definition).
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
88. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417 (1819) (stating that
postal clause included power to make mail robbery a crime).
89. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (“no Appropriation of Money to that Use”); id.
art. I, § 9, cl. 9 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law”); Hamilton, supra note 66, at 303 (describing “objects to which
[money] may be appropriated,” and “appropriation of money” (emphasis omitted)); Letter from
James Madison to James Monroe (Feb. 11, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 260,
260 (Robert A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal, eds. 1975) (“Let me have your commands also
as to the ballance I owe you. It is ready & will remain so till you direct its appropriation.”
(footnote omitted)); Appropriate, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828),
http://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/appropriate [https://perma.cc/U4RZ-EHMK]
(giving as first definition of verb “to appropriate” as “[t]o set apart for, or assign to a particular
use”); see also Appropriation, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828),
http://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/appropriation [https://perma.cc/JC6D-2TY6]
(defining “appropriation” as “[t]he act of sequestering, or assigning to a particular use or
person”); infra Part IV.C.
90. See infra Part III.D-E.1.
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and Hamilton could have been easily clarified by replacing “provide
for” with “spend for” or “appropriate money to.” The drafters of the
1861 Confederate Constitution reworked Clause 1 to obviate a
general welfare interpretation: “To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, for revenue necessary to pay the debts, provide for
the common defence, and carry on the government of the Confederate
States.”91 The inference from the “failure to draft better” is entirely
double-edged.
B. The General Welfare Clause and Interpretive Canons
Interpretive canons applicable during the Founding Era further
support the general welfare interpretation. Madison, the leading
Founding Era opponent of that interpretation, purported to rely on
interpretive canons to deviate from what he conceded was the literal
meaning of the General Welfare Clause.92 As Madison argued in
Federalist 41, and indeed throughout the rest of his life, reading the
General Welfare Clause as a general authorization to legislate on all
matters affecting the welfare of the nation would “den[y] any signification whatsoever” to the enumerated powers that follow in
Clauses 2 through 18 of Article I, Section 8.93 It would therefore
violate the anti-surplusage canon, which directs that legal instruments be interpreted so as to avoid making any provision “meaningless,” that is, functionless.94 Madison would later go on to make
explicit what was only implicit in Federalist 41: only by refusing to
interpret the General Welfare Clause as a broad authorization to
legislate for the general welfare could the idea of limited enumerated powers be preserved.95 Madison’s argument has been extremely

91. CONST. OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA of 1861, art. 1, § 8 (emphasis added).
92. See supra Part II.A.1. Lesser objections based on punctuation and style matters will
be discussed at the end of this Article. See infra Part IV.D.
93. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 41, at 263 (James Madison).
94. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 174 (2012) (defining the “surplusage” canon).
95. See Madison, Virginia Report, supra note 62, at 356 (“[W]hether the [General Welfare
Clause] be construed to authorize every measure relating to the common defence and general
welfare, as contended by some—or every measure only in which there might be an application
of money, as suggested by the caution of others—the effect must substantially be the same,
in destroying the import and force of the particular enumeration of powers.”).
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influential; it continues to be relied on to this day to reject a broad
“general welfare interpretation” of the General Welfare Clause.96
But the surplusage argument is obviously wrong. According to
Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner, a specific itemization that follows
a general term is not surplusage: “Following the general term with
specifics can serve the function of making doubly sure that the
broad (and intended-to-be-broad) general term is taken to include
the specifics.”97 This can be made clear “with a term such as including or even including without limitation .... But even without
those prefatory words, the enumeration of the specifics can be
thought to perform the belt-and-suspenders function.”98 Thus, the
anti-surplusage canon does not apply to “genus-followed-by-species”
or “general-specific sequences.”99 Nor, according to Scalia and
Garner, does the ejusdem generis canon apply to the general-specific
sequence, because that canon generally maintains that general
words following an enumeration are limited in scope by a preceding

96. See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 19, at 67-68 n.18 (noting that under a broad general
welfare interpretation “the remainder of Article I, Section 8 would be redundant (and the
doctrine of enumerated powers rendered nugatory)”); Michael Ramsey, David Schwartz on
Originalism and Indeterminacy, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Jan. 8, 2020, 6:23 AM),
https://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2020/01/david-schwartz-onoriginalism-and-indeterminacymichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/2ZTG-PH6S] (“And, of
course, reading the clause to allow Congress to ‘legislate’ for the general welfare would make
most of the rest of Article I, Section 8 superfluous.”); accord Natelson, supra note 19, at 11.
97. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 94, at 204.
98. Id.; accord Primus, supra note 1, at 2018-19.
99. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 94, at 204-05.
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specific enumeration.100 Instead, “[w]hen the genus comes first ...
one is invited to take it at its broadest face value.”101
Scalia and Garner’s interpretive principle was well-known in the
Founding Era. Madison demonstrated this in Federalist 41: “Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase,
and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars.”102
Nevertheless, he then simply dismissed the possibility that Clause
1 could have been drafted that way as “an absurdity.”103 But why
can’t we read the enumeration to “explain or qualify” the general
welfare power by offering examples of the kinds of things that would
qualify as legislating for the general welfare? Madison never
answered that question on textual grounds, in Federalist 41 or
elsewhere.
Once we acknowledge, with Scalia, Garner, and Madison himself,
that specific terms can meaningfully follow a general introduction,
we can see that Madison’s anti-surplusage argument rests on a false
dilemma: either the General Welfare Clause is itself a narrow
enumerated power, or the rest of the enumeration is meaningless.
The third, omitted possibility is that the General Welfare Clause is
indeed a general authorization to legislate on all national issues and
is designed to signal a non-exhaustive enumeration. Madison’s false
dilemma is a corollary to the false dilemma discussed above that
still taints enumerationism today: that the only alternative to
100. Id. Ejusdem generis is usually described as a canon that limits the scope of a general
term that follows an enumeration of specifics. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532
U.S. 105, 114-15 (2001). If we treat the General Welfare Clause as a garden variety enumerated power—the spending power—then the Article I, Section 8 enumeration takes on the
specific-general pattern, with the Necessary and Proper Clause standing as the following
general term. John Mikhail has argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause is a “sweeping
clause” that negates the inference of exclusivity of the Article I, Section 8 enumeration. John
Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1121-22 (2014). Whether or
not ejusdem generis always limits the general term, and whether or not it applies to sweeping
clauses, ejusdem generis would not support an enumerationist interpretation of Article I,
Section 8. Given the great importance and scope of “to regulate commerce” and “to declare
war,” it is hard to imagine what subjects of national importance would be excluded by the
more specific words of the enumeration under ejusdem generis. See Johnson, supra note 1, at
28 (arguing that ejusdem generis is nonlimiting in Article I, Section 8); Friedman, supra note
22, at 340 (“The enumeration might only have been an iteration of the types of powers
Congress possesses—sort of a constitutional ejusdem generis.”).
101. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 94, at 205.
102. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 41, at 263 (James Madison).
103. Id.
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limited enumerated powers is a general police power, a dichotomy
that ignores the possibility of a general power limited to national,
and excluding local, regulatory concerns.104
Further interpretive-canon support for the general welfare interpretation comes from the Constitution’s preamble. By resorting to
a canon of construction to diverge from the literal meaning of the
General Welfare Clause, Madison had to treat the Clause as ambiguous.105 But, according to William Blackstone, arguably the
leading authority on Anglo-American law in the Founding Era,106
“[i]f words happen to be still dubious, we may establish their
meaning from the context .... Thus the proeme, or preamble, is often
called in to help the construction.”107 In the preamble, the purposes
of the Constitution did not include protecting state sovereignty or
carefully limiting the powers of the national government. Instead,
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.108

Many Federalists in the early republic viewed the preamble as
setting out the ends or “objects” of the new national government,
and as Madison wrote in Federalist 44, “[n]o axiom is more clearly
established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is
required, the means are authorized.”109 Thus, some Federalists
relied in part on the preamble to argue that Congress had the power
to legislate for the general welfare.110 Under this view, the “powers”
104.
105.
106.
107.

See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 41, at 263-64 (James Madison).
See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 52, at 776.
1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE,
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 59 (1803).
108. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
109. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 41, at 285 (James Madison).
110. See 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 497-508 (1953); William M. Treanor, The Case of the Dishonest
Scrivener: Gouverneur Morris and the Creation of the Federalist Constitution, 120 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 5-7 (2021).
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of the national government were all means to the “ends” stated in
the preamble.111 The general welfare interpretation of the General
Welfare Clause fits seamlessly with such a view.
That the preamble is now treated “as an empty verbal flourish”112
may be another instance of confirmation bias stemming from our
assumption of an enumerationist Constitution.113 There is much
reason to believe that the subtle but consequential linguistic and
conceptual shift, by which the “objects” of the Constitution changed
from those stated in the preamble to those enumerated as “powers,”
was a contested ideological development rather than an original
intention.114
In sum, the primary textual argument against the general
welfare interpretation is based on a misapplication of the antisurplusage canon, which rests on a false dilemma. The generalspecific ordering and reference-to-the-preamble interpretive canons
are more on point, and they support the general welfare interpretation. The evident weakness of Madison’s surplusage argument is
obscured by confirmation bias stemming from our ideological commitment to enumerationism. Enumerationists rightly point out that
the general welfare interpretation would indeed undermine the
limiting effect of the enumeration. But the best enumerationists can
say is that the Constitution’s text does not foreclose a limited—
enumerated—powers interpretation. There is no compelling textual
basis for enumerationist readings of the General Welfare Clause in
particular, or the enumeration in general.
The argument for enumerationism is therefore not textual, but relies on some other modality: that the Framers or ratifiers intended
limited enumerated powers, that some “unwritten postulate of the
Constitution’s structure”115 requires enumerationism, or that some
111. 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 110, at 375.
112. Id. at 374.
113. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) (noting that the preamble
“has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power”); Milton Handler, Brian
Leiter & Carole E. Handler, A Reconsideration of the Relevance and Materiality of the Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 117, 117 (1990) (arguing that
preamble has been wrongly disregarded by courts and commentators).
114. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 110, at 400, 509 (chiding Madison for conflating “powers”
and “objects”).
115. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 104 (2008); see Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 918, 921 (1997).
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unwritten constitutional “ethos” like “liberty” or “federalism” is best
served by enumerationism.116 Typically, with Madison and most
enumerationists throughout history, this tacit non-textual argument
for enumerationism has been assumed, rendering the textual argument against the general welfare interpretation circular: the
enumeration is limiting because the General Welfare Clause is
limited to spending, and the latter is true because the enumeration
is limiting.
III. THE DRAFTING HISTORY OF CLAUSE 1: TAXES, DEBTS, AND THE
GENERAL WELFARE
Conventional historiography of the founding regards the Constitution as primarily designed to implement a federal republicanism
by carefully limiting the small set of important new powers granted
to the national government.117 But a newer “internationalist”
historiography emerging over the past two decades has argued that
the central issue for the Framers was not to “split the atom of
sovereignty,” in Justice Kennedy’s misconceived metaphor.118
Rather, it was to control republicanism while solidifying the place
of the United States in a threatening Atlantic world, ringed on all
sides by hostile European and Indian nations.119 To solidify its
existence, the government of the United States required the basic
overlapping elements of a European “fiscal-military” state120— independent taxing power, sound credit, and a capable national
defense—along with the regulatory power to control interstate
disharmonies that would tend to pull the union apart and open
doors for foreign alliances with individual states or regions.121

116. BOBBITT, supra note 46, at 7-8.
117. See Max M. Edling, Peace Pact and Nation: An International Interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States, 240 PAST & PRESENT 267, 287-88 (2018) (describing this
historiography).
118. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. See Edling, supra note 117, at 286-88.
120. See MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT 48 (2003).
121. See generally PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL
CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1775-1787 (1983); MAX M. EDLING, A HERCULES IN
THE CRADLE: WAR, MONEY, AND THE AMERICAN STATE, 1783-1867 (2014); GEORGE WILLIAM
VAN CLEVE, WE HAVE NOT A GOVERNMENT: THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND THE ROAD
TO THE CONSTITUTION (2017).
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This view of things casts Clause 1 in a very different light. It can
be seen as a broad introduction to the legislative powers by settling
the three most important objectives of the newly proposed fiscalmilitary United States government: the power to tax; the power to
restore credit (by paying the debts); and the power to preserve the
union by defending it militarily and reining in disharmonious state
legislation through powers to regulate national concerns. These
three prime objectives are all stated in the general welfare interpretation of Clause 1. Each of these three subjects—taxes, debts, and
the common defense and general welfare—had different origins and
pathways into Clause 1, and they arrived separately.122 The drafting
history thus supports the thesis that the Framers intended that the
leading interpretation of Clause 1 would be the three-power interpretation, and the general welfare interpretation in particular. The
language was made ambiguous to leave room for narrower, secondary interpretations.123
A. The Framers and Enumeration
The assumption of an enumerationist Constitution offers the
strongest reason to doubt the general welfare interpretation.
Therefore, to understand the Framers’ intentions with Clause 1, we
must examine their intentions regarding enumerationism. Contrary
to the conventional wisdom, the Framers as a whole were not
committed to the idea of limited enumerated powers.124 The
enumeration in Article I, Section 8, originated with the Committee
of Detail draft, reported to the full Constitutional Convention on
August 6, 1787.125 The Committee’s charge was to write up the
numerous resolutions approved by the Convention in the form of a
draft constitution.126 The resolution pertaining to the powers of
Congress read as follows:
122. See infra Part III.B.
123. See infra Part IV.
124. See supra note 1 for the growing body of literature advancing this thesis.
125. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 181-82 (Madison) (containing “the Report of the Committee of [D]etail” reported to the Convention).
126. Id. at 85 (Journal) (approving motion “that the proceedings of the Convention ... be
referred to a Committee for the purpose of reporting a Constitution conformably to the
Proceedings aforesaid”); id. at 129-33 (Committee of Detail papers) (listing Convention
resolutions submitted to the Committee of Detail).
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That the Legislature of the United States ought to possess the
legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and
moreover to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the
Union, and also in those Cases to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United
States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.127

This resolution was originally proposed as Resolution 6 of the
Virginia-Pennsylvania Plan, at the start of the Convention at the
end of May.128 The italicized language was added in July by an
amendment proposed by Delaware delegate Gunning Bedford.129
The resolution conforms to one of the primary purposes of calling
the Constitutional Convention in the first place: to add legislative
powers to what the Confederation Congress possessed.130 The Articles of Confederation had conferred several nontrivial powers on the
Union, including powers to declare war, conduct certain foreign
affairs functions, “appoint[ ]” maritime and prize courts, coin money,
fix the standards of weights and measures, regulate commerce and
relations with Indian tribes, “establish[ ]” or “regulat[e ]” post offices,
127. Id. at 131-32 (Committee of Detail papers) (emphasis added).
128. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed. 1911,
rec. ed. 1937) [hereinafter 1 FARRAND] (Madison). On May 29, Edmund Randolph introduced
the collection of resolutions outlining broad-brush provisions for the new constitution that
served as the de facto template for discussion from May 29 until the Convention adjourned
on July 26 to await the Committee of Detail’s draft. David S. Schwartz & John Mikhail, The
Other Madison Problem, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033, 2058 (2021); 1 FARRAND, supra, at 20-23
(Madison) (containing the text of the resolutions); id. at 30 (Journal) (recording that the
resolutions were “take[n] up” for discussion “to consider ... the State of the American union”).
I follow Dean Treanor’s excellent suggestion that these proposals “more accurately be labelled
the Virginia-Pennsylvania Plan” in light of the Pennsylvania delegation’s probably substantial
contribution. Prepublication posted version of Treanor, supra note 110, at 9. The resolutions
were known in the Founding Era as “the Randolph Plan,” and the “Virginia Plan” label probably owes much to historian Max Farrand and his marked tendency to exaggerate Madison’s
influence at the Convention. See Schwartz & Mikhail, supra, at 2040-42.
129. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 21 (Journal), 26 (Madison). For this reason the entire
resolution is often referred to, slightly inaccurately, as the Bedford Resolution. See, e.g.,
Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of “Commerce”, 2012 ILL. L. REV. 623, 644
(2012).
130. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 32-34 (1996); Constitutional Convention and Ratification, 1787-1789, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/
convention-and-ratification [https://perma.cc/4YE6-RTAH].
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and incur debt.131 Passing these on to the new national government
was uncontroversial, and was approved unanimously.132 The “legislate in all cases” language following the semicolon was somewhat
more controversial, but was nevertheless approved on July 17 by a
solid 8-2 vote of the state delegations present.133
The Committee of Detail reported back on August 6 with an
enumeration of powers that did not include the General Welfare
Clause, but did include the ultimately approved version of the
Necessary and Proper Clause.134 A scholarly debate has emerged
over whether the enumeration was intended to be limiting—that is,
to be read as exhaustive, according to the expressio unius canon, or
illustrative. The conventional view that the enumeration is exhaustive requires explaining away the Resolution 6 instruction to
authorize Congress to legislate “in all cases for the general interests
of the Union”135 to account for an enumeration that purportedly
limits Congress to legislate only in “some” such cases. This means
arguing either that the Committee of Detail flouted its instructions—for which there is no evidence other than the ambiguous
enumeration itself—or that Resolution 6 was all along intended to
be a mere placeholder for a limiting enumeration, which goes
against the weight of the evidence. Under the alternative view, the
Committee of Detail faithfully, or at least ambiguously, implemented the amended Resolution 6 with an illustrative, not exhaustive,
enumeration.136
There are at least two compelling reasons why the Framers would
have used an illustrative enumeration to implement a general authorization to legislate “in all cases for the general interests of the
union.”137 First, by listing the “legislative rights”—that is, powers—
“vested in Congress by the confederation,” the Committee could
131. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, arts. VI, IX, XII.
132. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 14 (Journal).
133. Bedford’s amendment was approved 6-4, and the clause as amended was then approved 8-2. See id. at 21 (Journal), 26 (Madison).
134. See id. at 181-82 (Madison).
135. Id. at 21 (Journal), 26 (Madison) (emphasis added).
136. See Mikhail, supra note 100, at 1096-1106, 1121-24 (ambiguously); GIENAPP, supra
note 81, at 60 (noting that of the supporters of Resolution 6’s general legislative authorization,
“few backtracked”); Balkin, supra note 1, at 11 (“[T]he purpose of enumeration was not to
displace the [Bedford amendment] principle but to enact it.”).
137. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 21 (Journal).
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most easily show that they obeyed that part of Resolution 6.138
Second, and relatedly, enumerating the most important powers
would be desirable to avoid—or to win—foreseeable debates over
whether a particular power was in fact “for the general interests of
the Union.”139 Suppose the Committee of Detail had merely enumerated those powers carried over from the Articles of Confederation, and then concluded the enumeration with “and to make all
other laws in the general interests of the union.” Under such a
Constitution, it would be easy to anticipate debates over whether a
proposed commerce regulation or bankruptcy law was “in the
general interests of the union.” It is much easier to show that a law
is a commerce regulation than that a commerce regulation “is in the
general interests of the union”—or so the Framers likely supposed.140 This is the “belt-and-suspenders” function of a generalspecific sequence described by Scalia and Garner.141
The historical record of the Framers’ intentions on this point is
not dispositive, but it strongly suggests conflicting views on a limiting enumeration. Some believed that the concept of limited
enumerated powers that characterized the Articles of Confederation
was confederative rather than national, and therefore fundamentally flawed.142 Others advocated a limiting enumeration.143 But
their outspokenness can as easily suggest a frustrated minority
view as a general consensus. Despite claiming a predisposition for
an enumeration, Madison was either doubtful about its feasibility
or convinced that it could not be done—lest some important federal

138. See id. at 14 (Journal).
139. See id. at 21 (Journal).
140. See Version of Wilson’s Speech by Thomas Lloyd, in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 350, 355 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (explaining the
purpose of enumeration was “to lessen or remove the difficulty arising from discretionary
construction on this subject”); Primus, supra note 1, at 2016-17; Balkin, supra note 1, at 11.
141. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 94, at 176-77.
142. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 37-39.
143. The South Carolina delegates Charles Pinckney and John Rutledge, and Georgia
delegate Pierce Butler insisted on knowing that the powers of Congress would be limited,
most likely to assure themselves that emancipating slaves would not be included in the list.
See 1 FARRAND, supra note 128, at 53 (Madison); 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 95, 364
(Madison); Primus, supra note 1, at 2021-23. Edmund Randolph and James Madison came to
prefer limited enumerated powers once they lost their bid for a Senate based on proportional
representation, in which, they believed, Virginia would be dominant. See JOSEPH M. LYNCH,
NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 21-23 (1999).
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power be excluded, presumably.144 James Wilson argued that “it
would be impossible to enumerate the powers which the federal
Legislature ought to have.”145 Other delegates tried to avoid debating the subject explicitly,146 perhaps believing that their views
were fully expressed by the wording of Resolution 6 and the Bedford
Amendment, which had been approved by large margins.147 When
Rutledge moved to refer the question of enumerated powers to a
committee for a compromise resolution, the delegates rejected the
motion by a 5-5 vote.148
The reaction of the full Convention to the Committee of Detail’s
draft enumeration is also ambiguous. When the Convention turned
to consideration of the enumerated powers on August 16, the delegates are recorded by Madison as going straight into a clause-byclause discussion without any delegate objecting to the substitution
of an enumeration for the Bedford Amendment principle.149 The
conventional view is that the absence of reported objection or debate
signaled a unanimous tacit approval. But this seems unlikely. The
fact of no objections—if it is a fact150—tells us only that the delegates interpreted the enumeration in a way that met their expectations, whether they expected the Committee to produce an exhaustive or illustrative enumeration.151 On August 18 and 20, a handful
144. Madison recorded in his notes for May 31 that “his doubts” about enumerating the
powers “had become stronger” but that he “could not yet tell” what his ultimate opinion would
be. 1 FARRAND, supra note 128, at 53 (Madison). But William Pierce of Georgia recorded
Madison as “at present ... convinced it could not be done.” Id. at 60 (Pierce). Bilder argues that
Madison revised his summary of his own speech after the fact to appear more open-minded
to limited enumerated powers. See BILDER, supra note 9, at 67-68.
145. 1 FARRAND, supra note 128, at 60 (Pierce).
146. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 17 (Madison) (speech of Nathaniel Gorham).
147. Id. at 21 (Journal), 26 (Madison).
148. Id. at 17 (Madison).
149. Id. at 304-10 (Madison).
150. Madison occasionally failed to record debates when his interest flagged. See BILDER,
supra note 9, at 123-25, 130.
151. Conventional scholars assume that a limiting enumeration was inevitable, or intended, all along. See LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE
FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 159-61 (1995); CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND
CONVENTION 208-09 (1966). Two more nuanced discussions at least recognize that a general
legislative authorization was on the table, but ultimately reach the conventional conclusion.
See RAKOVE, supra note 130, at 178 (assuming that a limiting enumeration was inevitable
after the “Great Compromise”); LYNCH, supra note 143, at 21-23 (arguing that Madison
maneuvered for limited enumerated powers once he lost his bid for proportional representation in the Senate). Perhaps the only historian of largely conventional views who even
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of delegates proposed a spate of additional enumerated powers.152
On September 14, more enumerated powers were introduced.153
Many of these were voted down as “unnecessary” according to
Madison,154 possibly because the proposed additional powers were
thought to be comprehended in ones already enumerated.
Assuming Madison’s notes are reliable on these points, the ambiguity remains. Those proposing additional powers may have
believed that the enumeration was exhaustive, or they may have
simply wanted to place their proposed additional power beyond
debate over its “national” character. Those rejecting proposed
powers as “unnecessary” may have assumed or hoped that the
powers already enumerated, even if exhaustive, would be construed
liberally or as carrying broad implied powers. Or they may have
viewed the new powers as unnecessary because Article I would
authorize all legislation “for the general interests of the union”—and, after September 4, all legislation “for the common
defense and general welfare.” Under this view, each newly added
enumerated power would detract from this “general welfare” authorization and support the argument for a limiting enumeration.155
At the end of the day, the Framers’ intentions are too ambiguous
to tell us for sure whether the enumeration must be read as
exhaustive or illustrative. But it is clear—or would be, if we put
aside enumerationist confirmation bias—that both views are substantially present. For reasons convincingly argued by Richard
Primus, the illustrative enumeration view better explains the
Constitution’s text than the exhaustive enumeration view.156
acknowledged that the delegates considered plenary national legislative powers beyond
August 17 is Irving Brant, though he, too, ultimately concluded that the Convention came
down decisively for limited enumerated powers. See IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER
OF THE CONSTITUTION 1787-1800, at 132-39 (1950).
152. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 321-22, 334-35 (Journal).
153. Id. at 614-18 (Madison).
154. Id. at 615-18 (Madison).
155. While a larger number of enumerated powers would strengthen, it would not prove an
exhaustive enumeration argument. The reason why not is a variation of the Sorites paradox.
See generally Sorites Paradox, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/ [https://perma.cc/VK5Q-BDY8]. Although the Article I,
Section 8 enumeration of seventeen powers plus the Necessary and Proper Clause might be
characterized as “pretty long,” there is no clear number of powers at which the list flips to
“long enough to be exhaustive.”
156. See Primus, supra note 1, at 2004-11, 2014-15, 2017-19, 2031. Primus identifies five
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Neither side was able to clearly win the point at the Convention,
and as in many instances in the final version of the Constitution,
the one thing the Framers agreed on was that ambiguity had an
upside. Proponents of each view had grounds to argue that the
Constitution supported them, and the ambiguities could be exploited
to push through to ratification.157
B. Taxes, the Public Debt, and Legislative Powers
Up to August 22, the date of the Committee of Detail’s crucial
second report,158 the Convention had debated, but not resolved,
central issues about taxes, the public debt, and the scope of national
legislative powers. The evidence raises two inferences about taxing
and spending powers that are critical to our inquiry. First, the
Convention seemed determined that a taxing power was not to be
hemmed in by specifying or limiting the purposes for which taxes
could be raised. Second, a spending power was deemed implied, and
thus did not need to be enumerated.
1. The Taxing Clause
The Convention delegates had a strong consensus about certain
principal failures of the Articles of Confederation and how they
should be fixed: the general government should have the power to
problems with the enumerationist interpretation of the enumerated powers: (1) all
acknowledged that the new government would have at least some significant unenumerated
powers; (2) the story that the Framers believed a bill of rights was unnecessary because the
enumerated powers were listed exhaustively was a post hoc rationalization for the ratification
debates; (3) scattering the powers throughout the Constitution, rather than listing them all
in one place, is inconsistent with an implied “these powers and no others” at the beginning
of Article I, Section 8; (4) amended Resolution 6 signified an intention to confer a general
legislative power; and (5) the enumeration was so predictably inept as a limitation—as was
obvious to Antifederalists—that we would be in effect judging the Framers as bad at
constitutional design if we attribute an enumerationist intention to them. See id. at 2007-11;
see also Schwartz, supra note 1, at 590-608. Primus goes on to show, first, that the
enumeration is better understood as an attempt to empower, far more than to limit, the
national legislature. See Primus, supra note 1, at 2011-18. He also demonstrates how
generating an exhaustive list of powers is a poor strategy for protecting the interests
purportedly served by the limiting enumeration—individual liberty or state sovereignty. See
id. at 2018-28.
157. See Hills, supra note 16, at 47-53.
158. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 366-68 (Journal).
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raise taxes first and foremost, with a separately specified power to
regulate interstate commerce a close second.159 Although the
delegates debated taxation issues extensively, the discussion never
turned to the purposes for which taxes would be raised. Instead, the
extensive discussions of taxation focused on two other matters.
First, the delegates paid considerable attention to whether direct
taxes would be apportioned among the states based on property or
population, and whether representation in Congress would be similarly based on property or population.160 Second, the delegates spent
several days debating their concerns that taxation of imports and
exports, which were anticipated to be the primary revenue-raising
measure, would be imposed in discriminatory ways against
particular state economies.161
Reference to an enumerated taxing power first appeared in the
New Jersey Plan, which was presented to the Convention on June
15 by the small-state bloc as an alternative to the more nationalistic
Virginia-Pennsylvania Plan.162 The New Jersey Plan’s second resolution tried to limit the purposes for which taxes could be raised. It
provided that “in addition to the powers vested in the U[nited]
States in Congress, by the present existing articles of Confederation,
they be authorized to pass acts for raising a revenue, by levying a
duty or duties” on all foreign imports, on domestic transactions, and
on the mails, “to be applied to such federal purposes as they shall
deem proper & expedient; [and] to make rules & regulations for the
collection thereof.”163

159. See supra text accompanying notes 130-42. Even Roger Sherman of Connecticut—who
initially advocated merely amending rather than replacing the Articles of Confederation, who
led the small state opposition that almost derailed the Convention, and who took states’ rights
positions throughout the Convention—agreed that a taxing power was one of the two most
important additions, along with a commerce power, to the national government. 1 FARRAND,
supra note 128, at 143 (King) (Sherman was “ag[ains]t a Gen[era]l Gov[ernmen]t” and in
favor of a “confederation of the States, with powers to regulate com[m]erce [and] draw therefrom a revenue.”).
160. See 1 FARRAND, supra note 128, at 196-97, 559-62, 592-97, 602-06 (Madison); 2
FARRAND, supra note 12, at 26, 202-03, 219, 273-80 (Madison).
161. See 1 FARRAND, supra note 128, at 585, 592-97, 602-06 (Madison); 2 FARRAND, supra
note 12, at 305-08, 360-63, 374-75 (Madison).
162. 1 FARRAND, supra note 128, at 242-45 (Madison).
163. Id. at 243 (Madison). Stamp taxes “on paper, vellum or parchment” presumably
referred to taxes on document-based transactions. See id.

894

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:857

But Edmund Randolph’s first draft of a constitution for the
Committee of Detail in early August rejected this crabbed view of a
taxing power whose sources would be limited to customs duties,
transaction taxes (called “stamp taxes”), and postage stamps.164 His
draft provides as the first enumerated legislative power: “To raise
money by taxation, unlimited as to sum, ... and to establish rules for
collection.”165 Randolph’s draft goes on to enumerate a total of
nineteen legislative powers, none of them expressly mentioning
spending.166 Later, Randolph added a purpose proviso to his version
of the Taxing Clause, tacking on “for the past or future debts and
necessities of the union,” to follow the word “sum.”167 It appears that
he and John Rutledge of South Carolina were collaborating at this
stage of the Committee of Detail’s work, as emendations appear on
the document in both Randolph’s and Rutledge’s handwriting.168 It
is possible that the “purpose” proviso was the result of discussion
with Rutledge to limit the scope of the taxing power, which then—as
now—was understood to have extensive regulatory potential.169
The nationalist viewpoint on the Committee of Detail was represented by James Wilson of Pennsylvania.170 In his handwritten copy
of the New Jersey Plan, Wilson had added “to lay and collect Taxes”
to that plan’s tax provision.171 The final report of the Committee of
Detail, based on a draft in Wilson’s handwriting with a few
emendations in Rutledge’s hand, begins the enumeration: “The
Legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises.”172 The limiting “purpose”
proviso by Randolph and Rutledge was omitted.173
The Convention began discussing the Committee of Detail draft,
section by section, on August 7.174 When the Convention turned to
the enumerated powers of Congress on August 16, the delegates
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 142-43 (Committee of Detail papers).
Id. at 142.
See id. at 143-44.
Id. at 142.
See William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 216 (2012).
See Johnson, supra note 1, at 28.
See, Mikhail, supra note 100, at 1047.
2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 157 (Committee of Detail papers).
Id. at 181 (Madison).
See id. at 163 & n.17 (Committee of Detail papers), 181 (Madison).
Id. at 193-94 (Journal).
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debated the taxing power for less than a full day.175 The discussion
focused almost entirely on the question of whether Congress would
have the power to tax exports.176 This was a fraught issue for the
agricultural, primarily southern slave states, whose economies were
dominated by exports and who thereby feared they would be overtaxed—and perhaps that slavery could be taxed out of existence—
without an export-tax ban.177 The delegates could not agree at this
stage and voted to postpone consideration of the question.178 The
scope of the taxing power remained to be settled.
2. The Public Debt Issue
One of the foremost issues of concern to the Framers was paying
off the nation’s Revolutionary War debt, owed primarily to France
and Holland.179 The Framers were exceedingly concerned about
establishing sound national credit with European lenders going
forward.180 This was essential to establishing a viable “fiscalmilitary” state that could defend the great republican experiment
that was the United States.181 In his speech introducing the
Virginia-Pennsylvania Plan, Randolph emphasized as the first and
foremost “defect” of the Confederation its failure to produce
“security agai[nst] foreign invasion,” noting that “foreign debts had
... become urgent.”182 The Framers recognized that taxes could never
be raised with sufficient rapidity to deal with war emergencies.
Instead, following the British model of national finance, they viewed
the nation’s tax-paying capacity as a security for the amortized
repayment of war loans.183
175. Id. at 303-04 (Journal), 304-08 (Journal).
176. Id. at 305-07 (Madison).
177. See, e.g., id. at 305-08 (Madison); 1 FARRAND, supra note 128, at 592 (Madison) (noting
that General Pinckney of South Carolina was “alarmed” at “the taxing of exports” and “hoped
a clause would be inserted ... restraining the Legislature from ... taxing Exports”).
178. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 303 (Journal).
179. See Richard Buel, Jr., Charles Beard Revisited: The Revolutionary Debt and the
Federal Constitution, in PAPERS ON THE CONSTITUTION 49, 66 (John W. Elsberg ed., 1990);
U.S. Debt and Foreign Loans, 1775-1795, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/loans [https://perma.cc/9FZ6-WL5S].
180. See OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, supra note 179.
181. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
182. 1 FARRAND, supra note 128, at 18-19 (Madison) (alteration in original).
183. See EDLING, supra note 121, at 45-47; VAN CLEVE, supra note 121, at 64-68.
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The power to pay national debts would seem to be a given. Long
after ratification, Madison would observe that the power to pay
debts is implicit in the power to borrow.184 Yet there were reasons
why the Convention did not want to leave the issue to implication.
While all the delegates acknowledged the urgent necessity to pay
both foreign and domestic creditors, the domestic debt situation was
chaotic. Not only was there a dazzling array of domestic debt
instruments of various types and terms floating around, but there
were significant complications caused by state indebtedness incurred for the national defense.185 The Articles of Confederation
expressly provided that “[a]ll charges of war, and all other expenses
that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare,
and allowed by the [U]nited [S]tates in congress assembled, shall be
defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the
several states.”186 This made the Confederation Congress responsible for the entangled postwar accounting between the states, but left
its authority vague.
The pattern of state indebtedness varied considerably, both in
terms of what the states had spent in support of the Revolutionary
War and in what they had paid back.187 Some states had even
assumed responsibility to repay their resident creditors of the
Confederation government.188 Constitutional scholars are familiar
with the shortcomings of the Confederation’s “requisition system,”
by which Congress obtained revenue indirectly through state taxation.189 Granting a direct taxing power to Congress was, of course,
a remedy to the breakdown of that system, due to the states’ failure
to meet their tax obligations to the Union.190 But the failure of the
requisition system was not necessarily a product of the states’ bad
184.
“A special provision ... could not have been necessary for the debts of the new
Congress: For a power to provide money, and a power to perform certain acts of
which money is the ordinary & appropriate means, must of course carry with
them a power to pay the expense of performing the acts.”
Madison to Stevenson, supra note 3, at 417.
185. See Buel, supra note 179, at 56.
186. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VIII.
187. E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC
FINANCE, 1776-1790, at 180-83 (1961).
188. Id.
189. See id. at 33-34 (describing requisition system).
190. VAN CLEVE, supra note 121, at 52-53.
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faith. Rather, their large shares of war debt required them to
impose taxes deemed unduly burdensome by their citizenry. This in
turn produced various forms of tax resistance, the most extreme
being outright rebellion, such as with Shays’s Rebellion in Massachusetts, which profoundly shook many of the leading founders.191
The Convention delegates were well aware of two intertwined
policy proposals to resolve the state-debt-and-taxation problem. One
was to revive an accounting of state debts and expenditures that
had stalled in the Confederation Congress.192 The other was for the
new national government to assume responsibility to pay off state
creditors for all debts in support of the Revolutionary War.193 This
latter “debt assumption” issue was highly controversial for two
reasons. Primarily, states believing that they would emerge from
the accounting process as national creditors worried that debt assumption would in effect bill them for other states’ debts.194
Secondarily, by 1787, many debt instruments had been resold in a
speculative financial market, often for pennies on the dollar by their
original holders: most often needy soldiers, farmers, or small
merchants. Repayment at anything close to face value would result
in a huge windfall to speculators, offending the actual or pretended
sense of fairness of some leaders.195 Debt assumption was thus one
of the foremost contentious policy questions in the late Confederation period, and it carried over into the Convention.
3. The Public Debt and Legislative Powers, August 18-21
By the end of the debate on August 17, the Convention had
worked through the enumeration of powers in the Committee of
Detail draft.196 When the Convention opened the next morning, several delegates introduced numerous additional powers to include in
the enumeration, ranging from the power to establish universities
(or “seminaries”) to the granting of charters of incorporation, most
191. See FERGUSON, supra note 187, at 245-50; EDLING, supra note 121, at 57-58, 61-68;
VAN CLEVE, supra note 121, at 76-82, 234-42.
192. See FERGUSON, supra note 187, at 204, 210, 213.
193. See id. at 306-07.
194. See id. at 308-09.
195. See id. at 296-98.
196. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 312-20 (Journal).
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of which were ultimately omitted.197 With those submissions on the
morning of August 18, two things must have been clear to the
Convention. First, success was in reach insofar as the Convention’s
fundamental objectives had already been agreed to: a national
government with executive and judicial branches added to the
national legislature, having powers to regulate the people directly
by taxing them and regulating commerce, as well as to conduct
foreign affairs and defend the nation militarily.198 Second, the
project could still die from a thousand cuts if the delegates engaged
in endless debates over details—whether potential deal-breakers
like the power to tax exports,199 personal hobbyhorses like George
Mason’s enumerated power to enact sumptuary laws,200 or numerous points in between. With those concerns in mind, the Convention
delegates assigned most contentious issues during this final month
to committees, creating six in all, compared to only four during the
first three months of the Convention.201 In addition, the Committee
of Detail continued to meet.202 From August 18 on, “[w]ith a few
exceptions, the important decisions were made [in committees], not
on the Convention floor.”203
On August 18, the debt issue arose for the first time on the
Convention floor.204 Among the spate of additional enumerated
197. Id. at 324-26 (Madison).
198. Id. at 308, 314-19 (Madison).
199. See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
200. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 344 (Madison).
201. See John R. Vile, The Critical Role of Committees at the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 147, 174 (2006). This count includes committees
assigned to consider substantive issues and excludes the two procedural committees, the
Rules Committee and Committee of the Whole. See id. at 149, 153. Professor Vile counts seven
committees created after the Committee of Detail. However, his count includes a supposed
five-member committee to consider bankruptcy and “full faith” provisions. Id. at 169; see also
BILDER, supra note 9, at 143 (identifying separate “bankruptcy and full faith” committee). But
as I read the records, that five-member committee was actually the Committee of Detail,
though not named as such by the Journal: its five members were the Committee of Detail
Members Rutledge (as Chair), Randolph, Wilson, and Gorham, with William Johnson of
Connecticut substituting for his fellow Connecticut delegate Oliver Ellsworth, who had by
then left the Convention. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 445 (Journal) (identifying the
members); id. at 483 (Rutledge presented the report, indicating that he was the chairman);
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 587 (Max Farrand ed. 1911, rec. ed.
1937) [hereinafter 3 FARRAND] (absence of Oliver Ellsworth from Convention as of August 27).
202. See Vile, supra note 201, at 166.
203. BILDER, supra note 9, at 142.
204. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 322 (Journal), 326 (Madison).
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powers proposed that morning was a provision “[t]hat Funds which
shall be appropriated for payment of public Creditors shall not
during the time of such appropriation be diverted or applied to any
other purpose.”205 Significantly, no enumerated power “to pay the
debts” had yet been proposed; presumably, a generic power to pay
debts was still assumed. The delegates referred this “non-diversion”
clause and all the other proposals to the Committee of Detail, which
would add a number of them to the final enumeration of powers.206
With the public creditor can of worms opened, John Rutledge
successfully moved “that a Grand Committee” (that is, a committee
with one member from each state delegation) “(be appointed to) consider the necessity and expediency of the U[nited] States assuming
all the State debts.”207 Why would Rutledge do this, since he chaired
the Committee of Detail, to which the “non-diversion” of funds to
pay the public debts was already referred?208 Quite possibly, he felt
that the five-member Committee of Detail was insufficiently
representative to resolve so contentious an issue as assumption,
which instead required a compromise among all eleven states
present.
Both committees wound up reporting recommendations on this
issue. On August 21, the Grand Committee recommended adding a
stand-alone clause to the enumeration of powers:
The Legislature of the United-States shall have power to fulfil
the engagements which have been entered into by Congress, and
to discharge as well the debts of the United States, as the debts
incurred by the several States during the late war, for the
common defence and general welfare.209

As written, this language is not a general power “to pay the debts,”
but a power expressly authorizing federal assumption of the state
debts. The provision would preclude constitutional objections to assumption and put it out of the power of any particular state
legislature to refuse assumption. After what Madison records as
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 322 (Journal).
See id. at 327 (Madison).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 352 (Journal).
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only two short speeches, the Convention unanimously decided to
postpone consideration of this proposed clause, perhaps because the
delegates knew that there would be a fight over assumption.
C. The (Forgotten?) Second Report of the Committee of Detail
On August 22, the Committee of Detail issued the report that is
central to our understanding of the General Welfare Clause. To this
point, the three issues of enumerated-versus-general powers, taxation, and the Revolutionary War debts had been debated as
separate issues. But for the first time, the Convention would begin
to link them.
Confirmation bias can cause us to miss important matters hiding
in plain sight in the written historical record. Our focus on the
Committee of Detail’s most important report of August 6, producing
the first draft of the Constitution, has obscured the remarkable
second report issued by that Committee on August 22, the day after
the Grand Committee report recommending an express debtassumption power. This report contains the first version of the
General Welfare Clause, and it has been essentially ignored by
historians and legal scholars.210
210. The disregard ranges from historians who do not consider the General Welfare Clause
at all, see, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 130, at 84-89; BANNING, supra note 151, at 159-61;
ROSSITER, supra note 151, at 208-10; MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 145-47 (2016); to those who mention the General
Welfare Clause in passing without seriously considering the general welfare interpretation,
see, e.g., RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 298-99 (2009) (fleeting acknowledgement of “varying” views on its meaning); LYNCH,
supra note 143, at 23 (uncritically adopting Madison’s interpretation); FORREST MCDONALD,
NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 264-65 (1985)
(same); to those who mention the August 22 Committee of Detail report without pausing to
consider its significance for the General Welfare Clause, see, e.g., David E. Engdahl, The Basis
of the Spending Power, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215, 243-48 (1995); to those who discuss the
August 22 Committee of Detail report while uncritically assuming all along that “provide”
meant “spend,” see, e.g., SKY, supra note 20, at 36-48. Even Professor Crosskey’s muchmaligned revisionist account, which copiously argues for the general welfare interpretation
of the General Welfare Clause, omits any mention of the August 22 report. See 1 CROSSKEY,
supra note 110, at 385-562.
I have found only two scholars who have even mentioned the proposed August 22 General
Welfare Clause, and both gloss over it. Charles Warren quotes the language and observes
correctly that it “would have given to Congress [a] practically unrestricted scope of legislation.” WARREN, supra note 13, at 600. But he immediately dismisses it because “the whole
theory of a National Government with strictly limited authority would have been dissipated.”
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The Committee of Detail’s August 22 report did not specifically
address the bulk of the sundry specific powers referred to it.211
Instead, the Committee proposed to add just three provisions. First,
it proposed adding the following language to the end of the taxing
power clause: “for payment of the debts and necessary expences of
the United States.”212 This language is almost identical to Rutledge’s
emendation of Randolph’s first Committee of Detail draft in late
July.213 It seems that Randolph and Rutledge were trying to morph
a proposal to constitutionalize an assurance to public creditors into
the previously abandoned specification or limitation of the purposes
of the taxing power. Second, the Committee proposed adding “and
with Indians” to the Commerce Clause.214
Third, the Committee of Detail proposed adding an extraordinary
provision to the end of the Necessary and Proper Clause. To convey
its full impact, I quote it in italics along with the then-existing
Necessary and Proper Clause language:
And to make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other
powers vested, by this Constitution, in the government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof;215 and to
provide, as may become necessary, from time to time, for the well
managing and securing the common property and general
interests and welfare of the United States in such manner as
shall not interfere with the Governments of individual States in

Id. Warren fails to consider why the Committee of Detail would have proposed this language
if it were such an obvious nonstarter. Instead, he simply asserts that “the Convention ... took
no action on this proposal.” Id. Less blinded by confirmation bias, Irving Brant suggests that
the August 22 report reflected that there was at least an ongoing debate over whether to give
Congress general or limited enumerated powers. See BRANT, supra note 151, at 132-39.
Nevertheless, Brant wrongly assumes that the General Welfare Clause in the August 22
report referred only to a spending power, and concludes, wrongly in my view, that the
Convention came down decisively for limited enumerated powers. See id. at 138-39.
211. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 366-67 (Journal).
212. Id. at 366 (Journal) (emphasis added).
213. See id. at 142 (Committee of Detail papers); Ewald, supra note 168, at 216.
214. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 367 (Journal).
215. Id. at 182 (Madison). In the final version of the Necessary and Proper Clause adopted
into the Constitution, the initial “And” was moved to the end of the previous clause, the word
“that” was changed to “which,” the commas before and after “by this Constitution” were
removed, and the final semicolon was replaced by a period. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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matters which respect only their internal Police, or for which
their individual authorities may be competent.216

This proposed language was apparently never voted on, but we
should pause to consider it. This language is clearly a forerunner to
the General Welfare Clause. To begin with, the state “competen[ce]”
language restores a key concept from Resolution 6 of the Virginia
Plan: that an important principle for distributing power between the
national and state governments is not the enumeration of specific
regulatory subjects but the relative “competen[ce]” of the two
governments. More importantly, the phrase “provide ... for” plainly
is not limited to spending. “[W]ell managing and securing the
common property” is not simply a question of applying money; it
also requires regulation. This same “regulatory” meaning of “provide
216. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 367 (Journal) (emphasis added). Madison’s notes do not
reproduce it, but instead mark a placeholder: a pointing finger with the interlineation, “Here
insert—the Report from the Journal of the Convention of this date.” Id. at 375 (Madison)
(parentheses omitted). Since those who read FARRAND’S RECORDS may gloss over the comparatively dry Journal in favor of Madison’s more colorful notes, we may have a partial
explanation of why this extraordinary language, buried in the middle of the Committee of
Detail’s otherwise dull report, has been missed.
The Journal also adds confusion by making two numbering errors in identifying the
proposal. First, the Journal states that the language was to be added “at the end of the 16
clause of the 2 sect. 7 article.” Id. at 367 (Journal). But the Necessary and Proper Clause was
in section 1 of article VII of the Committee of Detail draft, not the “2 sect.” as recorded by
William Jackson, the Convention secretary. See id. at 366 (Journal). Jackson started erroneously recording the enumerated powers as “the 2 sect.” immediately prior to the new
General Welfare Clause addition when he reported that the addition of the Indian provision
to the Commerce Clause would go “at the end of the 2nd clause, 2 sect.” See id. at 367
(Journal). Obviously, the Commerce Clause was in article VII, section 1, not section 2.
Compare id., with id. at 182 (Madison). Article VII, section 2 was the Treason Clause, to
which these additions would obviously have made no sense.
The second error was numbering the Necessary and Proper Clause as clause 16 when it
was, in fact, clause 18. See id. at 182 (Madison); see also id. at 367 (Journal) (approving “the
last clause of the 1st sect. 7 article” immediately after considering “the 17 clause”). Clause 16
granted the power “[t]o build and equip fleets,” id. at 182 (Madison), to which the general
welfare addition would have made no sense. Clause 17 granted the power “[t]o call forth the
aid of the militia,” id., to which, again, the general welfare language would not have been an
appropriate addition. The Committee of Detail’s enumerated powers were unnumbered, as
in the final Constitution. Id. Jackson understandably lost count, as he had on August 18,
when he double-counted a “14. clause,” failed to number the “Militia Clause” (clause 16), and
had to deal with proposed inserted clauses that were postponed for submission to the
Committee of Detail. Id. at 323 (Journal). If he had looked at his August 18 notes when
determining the number of the Necessary and Proper Clause, he would have misled himself
by seeing the last recorded number as “the 15 clause.” Id.
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... for” necessarily applies to the “general interests and welfare of
the United States.” As the eminent historian Charles Warren
recognized, this clause “would have given to Congress practically
unrestricted scope of legislation.”217 Although its drafter seems to
have made a half-hearted effort to dress it in sheep’s clothing by
talking first about federal property management, it truly is a broad
assertion of federal power: a “wolf [that] comes as a wolf.”218
Who might have appended this to the Necessary and Proper
Clause, and why? Signs point to James Wilson, who, as John
Mikhail and William Ewald have fairly established, was the author
of the Necessary and Proper Clause.219 On July 17, as the Convention debated the scope of national legislative power, Wilson had
seconded a motion by Roger Sherman to substitute the pending
Resolution 6 of the Virginia Plan with an authorization empowering
Congress to legislate “in all cases which may concern the common
interests of the Union: but not to interfere with” the states’ “internal
police” powers “wherein the general welfare of the United States is
not concerned.”220 Wilson, who at the start of the Convention argued
that a limiting enumeration “would be impossible,”221 on July 17
argued that this language “better express[ed] the general principle”
than did Resolution 6.222 Madison records a single delegate speaking
against Sherman’s July 17 motion: Gouverneur Morris argued that
“[t]he internal police, as it would be called & understood by the
States ought to be infringed in many cases, as in the case of paper
money & other tricks by which Citizens of other States may be
affected.”223 Morris undoubtedly spoke for a majority of delegates—including Madison, who was still relying on approval of his
national legislative veto over state laws—because the motion was
soundly rejected, 2-8, and was immediately followed by Bedford’s
motion to amend Resolution 6 to authorize Congress to legislate “in

217. See WARREN, supra note 13, at 600.
218. To use Justice Scalia’s phrase. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
219. See Mikhail, supra note 100, at 1047, 1053; Ewald, supra, note 168, at 271-72.
220. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 21 (Journal).
221. 1 FARRAND, supra note 128, at 60 (Pierce).
222. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 26 (Madison).
223. Id. (Madison).
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all cases for the general interests of the Union,” which was approved, 8-2 (Georgia and South Carolina voting no).224
Another set of Wilson’s fingerprints can be found in the wording
of the added General Welfare Clause. In 1785, Wilson had published
a pamphlet justifying the implied power of the Confederation
Congress to charter the national Bank of North America.225 There,
he had used the concept of “state competence” as a touchstone for
the dividing line between federal and state power: “Whenever an
object occurs, to the direction of which no particular state is
competent, the management of it must, of necessity, belong to the
United States in Congress assembled.”226 It was Wilson who most
likely inserted the language about state “incompeten[ce]” into the
original Resolution 6.227 The August 22 General Welfare Clause
restores the state competence concept that had dropped out of the
August 6 Committee of Detail draft. Even more Wilsonian is the
August 22 language, “provide ... for the well managing and securing
the common property and general interests and welfare of the
United States.”228 This phrasing echoes language from Article V of
the Articles of Confederation, on which Wilson had relied in his
Bank of North America pamphlet.229 There, Wilson had argued that
“[t]he United States have general rights, general powers, and
general obligations, not derived from any particular States, nor from
all the particular States, taken separately; but resulting from the
union of the whole.”230 He then quoted Article V as the textual basis
for this claim: “that for the more convenient management of the
GENERAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, delegates shall be
annually appointed [...] to meet in Congress.”231
Thus, the August 22 “general welfare” addition to the Necessary
and Proper Clause was, in all likelihood, Wilson’s work, perhaps
with an assisting push from Oliver Ellsworth passing along the
224. Id. at 24, 26 (Journal).
225. JAMES WILSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 3-4 (1785).
226. Id. at 10.
227. See Mikhail, supra note 100, at 1051, 1071-86.
228. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 367 (Journal).
229. WILSON, supra note 225, at 10.
230. Id.
231. Id. (quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V). Wilson capitalized the
phrase for emphasis, and the bracketed ellipsis indicates where Wilson simply omitted
(without ellipsis) the phrase “in such manner as the legislature of each State shall direct.”

2022]

THE LOST GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE

905

strong wishes of his fellow Connecticut delegate Roger Sherman, for
the “internal police” limitation. Sherman had a reputation for
legislative “cunning” and stubbornness in getting his way.232 He
would later reprise this bid to add restrictive state-police-power
language on September 15, as the Convention was polishing the
final version of the Constitution.233 While Sherman and Wilson
would no doubt have differed markedly on particular applications
of this general welfare addition, they had previously agreed on “the
general principle,” as Wilson put it. For Wilson, the sophisticated
lawyer, this language would have fully authorized national legislative inroads into state police powers so long as the issue in question
concerned the national interest. Sherman had explicitly justified his
July 17 proposal by pointing out that it was “difficult to draw the
line between the powers of the Gen[eral] Legislature[ ], and those to
be left with the States.”234 Wilson, as we have seen, agreed; and in
the Committee of Detail’s first report, he had tried to address this
issue by successfully revising the Randolph-Rutledge Necessary and
Proper Clause to strengthen it and make clearer that the enumeration was not exhaustive.235
The context of the August 22 Committee of Detail report further
suggests that a general welfare legislative power had considerable
support at the Convention. First, consider what else the delegates
referred to the Committee of Detail between August 18 and 20. On
August 18, Madison, Charles Pinckney, and others proposed long
lists of additional enumerated powers, which were referred to the
Committee.236 In addition, on August 20, Gouverneur Morris,
seconded by Pinckney, proposed a battery of executive departments
to form a “Council of State” that would include a “Secretary of
Domestic Affairs” with the “duty to attend to matters of general
police, the State of Agriculture and manufactures, the opening of
roads and navigations, and the facilitating of communications
232. On Sherman’s reputation, see 3 FARRAND, supra note 201, at 33-34 (Federal
Convention Records) (Jeremiah Wadsworth describing Sherman as “cunning as the Devil” and
“not easily managed”); William Pierce, Character Sketches of Delegates to the Federal Convention, in 3 FARRAND, supra note 201, at 88-89 (describing Sherman as “extremely artful in
accomplishing any particular object” and noting that “he seldom fails”).
233. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 629-30 (Madison).
234. Id. at 25 (Madison).
235. Mikhail, supra note 100, at 1096-1106.
236. See supra note 205.
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thro[ugh] the U[nited] States.”237 Morris did not propose adding
enumerated powers to match the matters to which the Secretary of
Domestic Affairs would “attend.”238 He probably assumed the
national government would already have a general police power.
Second, it must be recalled that Rutledge, the Committee of Detail
chair, had moved successfully on August 18 to refer the debtassumption issue to an eleven-member committee, presumably
because an all-states compromise would be needed to resolve so
controversial a matter.239 Yet he accepted the five-man Committee
of Detail’s jurisdiction over the Morris-Pinckney proposal for a
cabinet official to preside over implied national police powers.240
This suggests that a power to legislate for the general welfare was
deemed less controversial than debt assumption!
The Committee of Detail apparently regarded its August 22
report as concluding its business on all the items referred to it on
August 18 and 20.241 Significantly, none of the additional proposed
enumerated powers were reported by the Committee; they may have
considered them subsumed, or arguably subsumed, under a General
Welfare Clause.242 The unreported proposals included Morris’s
Council of State. Morris was one of the most active and strongminded members of the Convention, making numerous motions and
more floor speeches than any other delegate and serving on several
key committees.243 It seems odd that he would let his August 20
proposals disappear without a peep, yet neither the Journal nor
Madison’s notes suggest any motions or speeches on them after they
were referred to the Committee of Detail. A plausible explanation
is that he was persuaded, perhaps by his fellow Pennsylvanian
Wilson, that they were best subsumed into a General Welfare
237. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 335 (Journal), 342-43 (Madison).
238. See id. at 335-36 (Journal).
239. Id. at 322 (Journal).
240. Id. at 334-36 (Journal).
241. On August 29, the Convention referred two more provisions to the Committee of
Detail: to consider revising the Full Faith and Credit Clause and adding a bankruptcy power.
See id. at 445 (Journal). The Committee reported on these points on September 1. See id. at
483-84 (Journal). Otherwise, all committee referrals after August 22 were to eleven-member
committees. See Vile, supra note 201, at 166-72.
242. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 366-68 (Journal). The only other change to the
enumerated powers was to add “and with Indians, within the Limits of any State, not subject
to the laws thereof” to the Commerce Clause. Id. at 367.
243. Treanor, supra note 110, at 30-45.
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Clause added to the Necessary and Proper Clause. We do know that
Morris privately asserted on September 6 that a federal power over
internal improvements was subsumed into the later Clause 1
version of the General Welfare Clause.244
As of August 22, the Committee of Detail proposal for the enumeration began:
[The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts, and excises] for payment of the debts and
necessary expenses of the United States—provided that no law
for raising any branch of revenue, except what may be specially
appropriated for the payment of interest on debts or loans shall
continue in force for more than __ years.245

And the proposed enumeration ended with a robust, catchall
Necessary and Proper Clause that included a General Welfare
Clause authorizing regulatory powers.246 It thus seems likely that
by August 22, Wilson was able, in the Committee of Detail, to
strengthen the position of a non-exhaustive enumeration even
further than in his prior August 6 draft of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Perhaps Wilson had wanted such general welfare language
all along, but previously had to compromise it away in the August
6 Committee of Detail report. Rutledge, the Committee of Detail
chair, may by August 22 have softened his earlier insistence on
enumerated powers, having won a major concession for the slave
states—a ban on federal export taxes—the previous day.247 Either
way, the August 22 report effectively restored the Bedford Amendment to the enumeration of powers. This fact tends to undermine
the assumption that the Convention had tacitly accepted an exhaustive enumeration on August 17, and it supports the view that
a national legislative authorization delegated in general terms was
still being advocated—albeit in committees, outside the purview of
Madison’s notes.248
244. See infra Part IV.B.
245. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 366-67 (Journal) (blank space in original).
246. See id. at 367.
247. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 363 (Madison). Rutledge was an old friend of Wilson’s
and lived at Wilson’s Philadelphia home during the Convention, where Wilson may have been
able to persuade him to alter his opinion. See BEEMAN, supra note 210, at 269.
248. See BRANT, supra note 151, at 132-34.
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D. Taxing, Debt, and Assumption Revisited
The August 22 Committee of Detail report reintroduced a loose
linkage between the idea of an express general welfare power and
a proviso stating the purpose of federal taxation—a linkage previously made in the July 17 Sherman-Wilson motion that the
Convention rejected.249 At this point, the debate would create linkages between the issues of taxation and debt assumption.
Consideration of the Committee of Detail’s August 22 report was
postponed to allow the delegates time to digest it.250 But near the
end of that day, the Convention took up the Grand Committee’s
August 21 version of a debt-paying clause.251 After a brief debate
reflecting concerns about whether a future government would seek
to renege on Revolutionary War debts and whether Congress should
be required or merely authorized to assume state debts, Gouverneur
Morris moved to substitute the Grand Committee’s freestanding
debt clause with: “The Legislature shall discharge the debts & fulfil
the engagements of the U[nited] States.”252 Morris’s amendment
seems to have been a compromise of sorts. On the one hand, he
made the payment of debts mandatory; on the other, he removed the
specific reference to Revolutionary War debts and assumption, essentially papering over that dispute with broad language expressing
an unexceptionable obligation to pay debts.253 This motion showcases Morris’s penchant for strategically ambiguous draftsmanship.
The delegates unanimously adopted Morris’s amendment.254
The next day, August 23, the Convention agreed to place this
language at the beginning of the enumeration of powers, by amending the Taxing Clause as follows:
The Legislature shall fulfil the engagements and discharge the
debts of the U[nited] S[tates], & shall have the power to lay &
collect taxes duties imposts & excises.255

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 21 (Journal), 26 (Madison).
Id. (Journal).
Id. (Journal).
See id. at 377 (Madison) (parentheses omitted).
See id. (Madison).
Id. at 368 (Journal), 377 (Madison).
Id. at 392 (Madison).
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As written, this version of Clause 1 of the enumerated powers
granted two distinct powers: to pay the debts and to tax. Further,
the debt-paying power had two elements. The “engagements” clause
was a carryover obligation, by which the Constitution would
disclaim any intention of the United States government to use a
new constitution as an opportunity to renounce preexisting debts.256
The second element was the “discharge” clause, which, despite
dropping the express debt-assumption language, could still be
understood, and undoubtedly was understood by many, to be an
effort to authorize Congress to assume the states’ Revolutionary
War debts.257 Pierce Butler of South Carolina voiced this understanding: immediately after the August 23 version of the debt-tax
clause was approved, he denounced it and moved for reconsideration, arguing that debt assumption would benefit speculators
(“[b]lood-suckers”) who bought up government notes from desperate
first-holders (presumably soldiers and small merchants) at substantial discounts.258
This issue of speculators as windfall creditors, which would return with a vengeance during the congressional debt assumption
debate of 1790-91,259 was picked up by other delegates when Butler’s
reconsideration motion was taken up on August 25.260 George Mason
argued that the requirement imposed by the word “shall” would
encourage speculators.261 Elbridge Gerry, allowing his proto-Antifederalist views to give way to his personal ownership of U.S.
government bonds, sounded positively Hamiltonian in replying that
there was no reason to censure the “[s]tock-jobbers,” as they created
a market for the government paper and sustained its value.262
Edmund Randolph then sought to finesse the disagreement by
substituting an alternative provision that would split up the clause
by peeling off the “debt assumption” issue and refocusing the debate
on the less controversial “engagements” issue.263 Randolph moved
a provision that “[a]ll debts contracted & engagements entered into,
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 110, at 507.
See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 392 (Madison).
See id.
See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 136-61 (1993).
2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 412-13 (Madison).
Id.
Id. at 413 (Madison).
Id. at 414 (Madison).
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by or under the authority of [the Confederation] Con[gres]s shall be
as valid ag[ain]st the U[nited] States under this constitution as
under the Confederation.”264 Because the Confederation Congress
had not yet assumed any state debts, this language avoided any
commitment on assumption. Randolph’s substitute was adopted,
with only Pennsylvania voting against the maneuver, and it was
ultimately incorporated as Article VI, Clause 1 of the final Constitution, with only stylistic changes.265 Randolph’s motion had the effect
of tabling final approval of the amended version of Clause 1, which
still proposed to begin the enumeration with a debt-paying obligation.266
Immediately after the adoption of Randolph’s motion, still on
August 25, Roger Sherman argued that it was “necessary to connect
with the clause for laying taxes duties & c an express provision for
the object” of taxation, including “the old debts & c.”267 He therefore
moved to add the following italicized language to Clause 1:
The Legislature shall fulfil the engagements and discharge the
debts of the United-States, and shall have the power to lay &
collect taxes duties imposts & excises for the payment of said
debts and for the defraying the expenses that shall be incurred for
the common defence and general welfare.268

Sherman’s motion sought to include the exact phrase “common
defence and general welfare,” which had been used in a similar
context in the Articles of Confederation—referring to appropriations.269 It is also the first instance in which the Convention
specifically voted on a proposal to add a “purpose” proviso to the
taxing power. The Committee of Detail’s similar August 22 recommendation for a purpose proviso appears never to have been

264. Id. (Madison).
265. See id. (Madison); U.S. CONST. art. VI.
266. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 414 (Madison).
267. Id. (Madison). Madison’s notes say that Sherman advocated “an express provision for
the object of the old debts [etc.].” This makes no sense, and is probably Madison’s mistranslation of his own notes.
268. Id. (Madison) (emphasis added).
269. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. VIII.
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separately discussed. Sherman’s proposal was decisively voted
down, 1-10, with only Connecticut voting aye.270
We can now pause to take stock of where things stood with Clause
1. With a General Welfare Clause pending as a possible addition to
the Necessary and Proper Clause, a motion had been made and
approved to insert a debt-paying obligation (and an arguable debtassumption power) as the very first enumerated power, prior to the
power to lay and collect taxes. This was then postponed in favor of
a weaker, related provision to refrain from repudiating the union’s
preexisting debts (the “Engagements Clause”), a provision whose
location in the Constitution was unspecified and which would wind
up in Article VI, far removed from the enumerated powers. Sherman’s bid to limit the taxing power by connecting it with the
payment of debts and expenses was decisively rejected. As of August
25, the wording of Clause 1 had not yet been settled.
E. The Final Version of Clause 1
The version of Clause 1 that wound up in the final draft of the
Constitution was the product of another ad hoc committee. In
relatively concise language, Clause 1 addressed all three of the
foregoing issues that had been debated separately: whether to
specify the purpose of federal taxation, whether to authorize or
obligate the new Congress to assume state Revolutionary War
debts, and whether to include a catch-all power to legislate “for ...
the general welfare.”
1. The Committee on Postponed Parts
The debt and general welfare issues were as yet unresolved. The
addition of a taxing purpose proviso had been rejected, but its dogged sponsor, Roger Sherman, would not let it rest. On August 31, on
a motion by Roger Sherman, the Convention created a committee to
deal with loose ends: a committee to which “to refer such parts of
the Constitution as have been postponed, and such parts of reports
as have not been acted on.”271 This has come to be known as the
270. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 414 (Madison).
271. Id. at 473 (Journal), 481 (Madison).
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Committee on Postponed Parts, or the Brearley Committee, after its
chair, David Brearley of New Jersey.272 The Committee on Postponed Parts was another “Grand Committee” of eleven members,
one from each state delegation in attendance, selected by ballot. In
addition to Brearley, its membership included Sherman, Gouverneur Morris, and Madison.273
The Journal makes no reference to the specific matters referred
to this Committee, and Madison’s notes likewise fail to do so, but we
know what the Committee reported on September 1, 4, and 5.274
These comprised the ineligibility of members of Congress to hold
executive offices, the addition of “Indian tribes” to the Commerce
Clause, a revision of the impeachment process, a handful of
additions or amendments to the enumerated powers, and numerous
provisions about the President and Vice President.275 The documentary record of the Committee’s work is exceedingly thin. It has
become best known for creating the Electoral College and adding the
Senate advice-and-consent clauses, since these aspects of its work
have soaked up almost all the scholarly attention afforded the
Committee.276 Thus, its redrafting of Clause 1 has flown largely
under the historical radar.277
By definition, the “postponed parts” were proposals and motions
that had not been finally acted upon. Among the many issues
potentially within the Committee’s purview, the two most relevant
here were the pending versions of Clause 1 (the taxing power) and
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Amended on August 23, but not
finally approved, Clause 1 stood as a two-power clause, enumerating
powers to pay the debts from the Revolutionary War and to collect
taxes:
272. See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 210, at 297. It is also sometimes referred to as the
“Committee on Postponed Matters,” or “Committee of Unfinished Parts.” See, e.g., BILDER,
supra note 9, at 143; BRANT, supra note 151, at 135; Vile, supra note 201, at 169-70.
273. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 473 (Journal).
274. Brant extracts a purportedly complete list of “postponed” matters from Madison’s
notes. See BRANT, supra note 151, at 135.
275. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 483, 493-95, 505 (Journal).
276. See id. at 495 (Journal).
277. See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 210, at 298-99; RAKOVE, supra note 130, at 89-91, 17880. But see BRANT, supra note 151, at 132-39. The one full-length biography of Committee
chair David Brearley does not even mention the Committee’s revision of the General Welfare
Clause. See DONALD SCARINCI, DAVID BREARLEY AND THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 193-211 (2005).
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The Legislature shall fulfil the engagements and discharge the
debts of the United-States, and shall have the power to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.278

The postponed version of the Necessary and Proper Clause was the
revised August 22 version issued by the Committee of Detail, that
now included a General Welfare Clause.279 Not among the postponed
matters was Roger Sherman’s motion to add a purpose proviso to
the Taxing Clause—that had been acted upon, and overwhelmingly
rejected, on August 25.280
On September 4, the Committee on Postponed Parts reported a
new version of an amended Clause 1: “The Legislature shall have
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay
the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare
of the United States.”281 This version of the clause was adopted,
unanimously and without any debate, according to Madison’s
notes.282 But for capitalization, and substituting “Congress” for
“Legislature,” this version appears in the final Constitution.283
The Committee on Postponed Parts thus made three noteworthy
changes to Clause 1. First, it flipped the order of debts and taxes,
placing taxes first. Second, it watered down the debt-paying
language. No longer did the clause obligate paying the debts, but
rather authorized it. This corresponded with the express views of
Roger Sherman, among others.284 Moreover, the debt language now
sounded as though it referred generically to present and future
debts, rather than specifically to the Revolutionary War debts. This
made it possible to read “to pay the debts” as part of a taxingpurpose proviso. The “engagements” language had been made
redundant by the adoption of Randolph’s motion of August 25 to
include that obligation in a separate provision—now the Engagements Clause of Article VI.
Third, and most critical to this discussion, the Committee
proposal added a reworked and more elegant—but also more
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 382 (Journal).
Id. at 367 (Journal).
Id. at 414 (Madison).
Id. at 493 (Journal).
Id. at 497, 499 (Madison).
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 327 (Madison).
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ambiguous—version of the General Welfare Clause that had previously been added to the Necessary and Proper Clause. At the same
time, the Committee declined to report explicitly on the August 22
proposal to add a general welfare power to the Necessary and
Proper Clause. Taking these two points together, the net effect of
the Committee of Postponed Parts report was to relocate the
General Welfare Clause from the end of the enumerated powers to
the beginning, in Clause 1.
2. Finalizing the Constitution
The Convention records show no further motions or proposals
that bear directly on the General Welfare Clause. On September 8,
the Convention formed a five-man committee now known as the
Committee of Style and Arrangement. Its members included
Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris, and Madison, along with William
Johnson of Connecticut and Rufus King of Massachusetts.285
Significantly, Madison, Morris, and King had all served on the
Committee on Postponed Parts.286
The Committee of Style is known for taking the ungainly twentythree-article working draft and rearranging it with comparative
elegance into seven articles. But historians agree that the Committee’s work product went beyond non-substantive editing. This
observation has focused on Gouverneur Morris, one of the Convention’s most determined nationalists. Recall his comment that state
police powers “ought to be infringed in many cases.”287 According to
Morris himself, and to Madison years later, it was Morris who took
on the lion’s share of the drafting work of the Committee of Style.288
Dean William Treanor has suggested that the finished product
included a handful of substantive linguistic turns that served
Morris’s nationalist agenda, and that, taken together, are suggestive of “Gouverneur Morris’s Constitution.”289
285. Id. at 547 (Madison).
286. Id. at 473 (Journal).
287. Id. at 26 (Madison) (emphasis added).
288. James Madison to Jared Sparks (Apr. 8, 1831), supra note 3, at 447-48; Gouverneur
Morris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 22, 1814), in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION vol. 4, art. 3,
sec. 2, cl. 1, doc. 60 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1986), http://press-pubs.uchicago.
edu/founders/documents/a3_2_1s60.html [https://perma.cc/2G67-WTU7].
289. See generally Treanor, supra note 110.
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The Committee of Style issued its report, the near-final draft of
the Constitution, on September 12, five days before the Convention
concluded its business.290 The Committee rearranged the articles
such that the enumerated powers, formerly Article VII, Section 1,
became Article I, Section 8. The enumeration now began as follows:
The Congress may by joint ballot appoint a treasurer. They shall
have power
To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to pay the
debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare
of the United States.291

The Committee of Style report also presented the Necessary and
Proper Clause in its original August 6 form as written by the Committee of Detail (with only minor changes).292 This probably followed
in due course from the Committee on Postponed Parts’ relocation of
the General Welfare Clause to the end of Clause 1 and its failure to
propose any change to the previously approved August 6 version of
the Necessary and Proper Clause.293 If this was indeed the bargain
inside the Committee on Postponed Parts, then Morris, Madison,
and King would have been in a position to convey that to the other
two members of the Committee of Style, Johnson and Hamilton.294

290. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 582 (Journal).
291. Id. at 590, 594-96 (Committee of Style Report) (footnote omitted). Farrand’s transcription is based on Madison’s copy, which contains Madison’s handwritten interlineations.
These consist of Madison’s recording of the further emendations by the Convention and
Madison’s letter-numbering of the various clauses. I have omitted these letter-numbers, as
well as a period after “They shall have power,” apparently a typographical error by Farrand.
Id. at 594 (Committee of Style Report). The digital photo of Madison’s copy on the Library of
Congress website, though blurry, appears not to have this period. See Creating the United
States: Convention and Ratification, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/ creatingthe-united-states/convention-and-ratification.html [https://perma.cc/XP4N-E8JB] (containing
clearer copies from additional delegates).
292. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 596 (Committee of Style Report).
293. The August 22 General Welfare Clause language dealing with the “well managing”
of federal property wound up in the Territories Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The
Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”); 2 FARRAND, supra
note 12, at 459 (Journal), 466 (Madison) (showing August 30 vote approving this provision);
Engdahl, supra note 210, at 248-51.
294. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 473 (Journal).
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The short-lived appearance of the treasurer-appointment provision bears only tangentially on the interpretation of Clause 1.295
That provision was stricken on separation-of-powers grounds two
days later, on September 14, by an 8-3 vote.296 The Committee of
Detail had originally made appointing a treasurer the ninth
enumerated power in its August 6 draft.297 By placing it before the
word “power”—that is, before starting to list the legislative powers
of Congress—the Committee of Style both underscored the importance of the treasury post and implied that it was a structural
provision about the composition of Congress rather than a legislative power.298
Most significantly, the Committee of Style dramatically reworked
the Constitution’s Preamble. The Committee of Detail’s draft preamble had begun, “We the people of the States of New Hampshire,
[et cetera],” and had listed no purposes.299 The Committee of Style
famously changed this to the well-known final version, beginning
“We the People of the United States,” and listed several broad
purposes—including to “promote the general Welfare.”300 As argued
above, this change to the preamble strengthens the general welfare
interpretation of Clause 1,301 and was probably intended to do so.302
The Convention made a handful of changes to the Committee of
Style Draft over the next few days, voting to approve the draft, as
amended, on Saturday, September 15.303 Over the remainder of the
weekend, the final version of the Constitution was “engrossed”
(handwritten) and then signed on Monday, September 17.304

295. See id. at 614 (Madison).
296. Id. (Madison).
297. Id. at 182 (Madison).
298. Id. at 614 (Madison). There are also punctuation changes from the Committee of Style
draft to the final version; as I shall explain, these did not affect the meaning of Clause 1. See
infra Part IV.D.
299. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 177 (Madison).
300. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see supra text accompanying notes 107-10.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 106-15.
302. See infra text accompanying note 345.
303. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 622 (Madison).
304. Id. at 648-49 (Madison).

2022]

THE LOST GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE

917

IV. THE GENERAL WELFARE POWER AND STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY
The text and drafting history of Clause 1 favor the general
welfare interpretation of the General Welfare Clause. There was
probably insufficient support to express that interpretation unambiguously, however. It seems likely that proponents of enumerationism successfully bargained for strategically ambiguous language
as a compromise that would leave interpretive space for the
narrower “taxing purpose” interpretation later promoted by
Jefferson.305 The spending power interpretation that ultimately prevailed seems to be completely absent from the Convention records.
A. Signs of a General Welfare Compromise
The evidence of a strategically ambiguous “general welfare
compromise” includes (1) the views of key players, particularly
Wilson, Morris, and Sherman; and (2) the various movements and
revisions that resulted in the final wording and placement of the
General Welfare Clause. Most of this evidence has been discussed;
here, I will offer some additional evidence and analysis.306
1. The Views of Wilson, Morris, and Sherman
James Wilson, Gouverneur Morris, and Roger Sherman—three of
the most active and strong-minded members of the Convention—
probably played key roles in the final compromise language of the
General Welfare Clause. They served on the key committees involved in its drafting: Wilson, on the Committee of Detail; Sherman,
305. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
306. The only previous scholarly account suggesting that the Committee on Postponed
Parts reached a compromise on the General Welfare Clause is the brief sketch by Madison
biographer Irving Brant. See BRANT, supra note 151, at 132-39. Brant portrays all the
business conducted by the Committee on Postponed Parts as producing a single, complex
compromise with numerous moving parts. Id. at 135. He may be right about this, and his
account is worth further study. But the three-way compromise I describe below stands on its
own. Brant’s suggestion that numerous pieces extraneous to my account were needed to win
this or that vote are purely speculative. See id. at 134-37. Finally, Brant wrongly assumes,
without any evidence, that the final version of Clause 1 was understood on all hands to be a
spending power. See id. at 139.
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on the Committee on Postponed Parts; Morris, on the Committees
on Postponed Parts and of Style.307
All three had made motions and taken strong positions on
matters intertwined with the final version of the General Welfare
Clause. These issues were how to express the powers of Congress in
general, the power of taxation in particular, and the power or duty
to repay the Revolutionary War debt.308 On the Convention floor on
July 17, Wilson had seconded a resolution by Sherman that would
have defined the powers of Congress in general terms.309 That
motion was itself a compromise: it would have authorized Congress
to legislate “in all cases which may concern the common interests of
the Union” while enjoining it “not to interfere with” state “internal
police” powers.310 Morris strongly opposed it, probably because he
understood that the Supremacy Clause would produce some
preemption of state laws.311 On August 20, Morris, seconded by
Charles Pinckney, assumed a national police power by proposing to
create a cabinet secretary to “attend to” such a power.312 Wilson had
fought successfully in the Committee of Detail prior to its first
report on August 6 to include “sweeping clause” language in the
Necessary and Proper Clause (“and all other powers”).313 That
language could be construed, and was construed by many, as
negating the inference of an exhaustive enumeration.314
Sherman’s opposition to a broad General Welfare Clause would
likely have been supported on the Committee on Postponed Parts by
Pierce Butler of South Carolina, who had always favored an
enumeration of powers.315 Further impetus for the compromise may
307. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 473 (Journal), 547 (Madison).
308. See supra Part III.B.
309. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 26 (Madison).
310. Id. at 21 (Journal).
311. Id. at 26 (Madison); see Schwartz & Mikhail, supra note 128, at 2074.
312. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 335-36 (Journal). By seconding this motion, Pinckney
appears to have shifted away from an enumerationist position. See supra note 143. This
suggests that for him, and perhaps other pro-slavery delegates, enumerationism was a
second-best structural protection for slavery—one that Pinckney, at least, could abandon after
accomplishing two other concessions to the slave states: the Three-Fifths Clause and the
export tax ban.
313. Id. at 182 (Madison).
314. Mikhail, supra note 100, at 1121-22.
315. 1 FARRAND, supra note 128, at 53 (Madison) (statement of Butler); 2 FARRAND, supra
note 12, at 17 (Madison) (statement of Butler); id. at 24 (Journal) (showing South Carolina
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have come from George Mason, who by late August was already
gathering himself to oppose the Constitution; he would be one of the
three who on September 17 refused to sign it.316 On August 31, the
day the Committee on Postponed Parts was formed, Mason apparently circulated a short list of his objections and “proposed alterations” to the Constitution to a handful of delegates, including at
least two of the Committee’s members, Butler and John Dickinson.317 One of Mason’s alterations was that “[t]he Objects of the
National Government to be expressly defined, instead of indefinite
powers, under an arbitrary Constructions [sic] of general
Clauses.”318 Mason objected to “[t]he sweeping Clause” which
“absorbs every thing almost by Construction.”319 He knew that the
Committee would be considering the August 22 proposal to strengthen that clause.
On debt and taxes, Roger Sherman made his views clear that it
was “necessary to connect” the taxing power with a statement of the
purpose of taxation, including the payment of debts, and he
proposed an amendment to that effect on August 25.320 Morris
favored addressing the Revolutionary War debt explicitly, at the
start of the enumerated powers, and making repayment obligatory
on Congress.321 Sherman opposed constitutionalizing a repayment
obligation.322
2. The Contours of the Compromise
Historians of the Convention label the agreement to establish
equal state suffrage in the Senate as the Great Compromise.323 At
the same time, it is widely acknowledged that the Constitution
contains many compromises, on matters both of principle and of
state or regional interests. Some of these were effectuated in clear,
voted “no” on Resolution 6).
316. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 648-49 (Madison).
317. SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
251 & n.1 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 249 & n.1.
320. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 414 (Madison).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See, e.g., WARREN, supra note 13, at 267.
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specific language, like the export tax prohibition demanded by the
slave states;324 others in encoded language, like the Fugitive Slave
and Migration and Importation Clauses, which eschewed the words
“slave” or “slavery.”325 Other compromises relied on strategic ambiguity: employing ambiguous terms in place of clearer ones, or the
judicious use of gaps or silences, for the specific purpose of postponing or papering over disagreements. The disagreements would not
necessarily have been intractable disputes among the Convention
delegates. Instead, at least some “compromises” were with
decisionmakers not present at the Convention: these compromises
anticipated likely objections by moderates in the forthcoming
ratification campaign. In these latter cases, strategic ambiguity was
an important, if not essential, method to accommodate objections in
a process in which the states would be foreclosed from conditioning
their ratifications on changes to the Constitution. In deploying
strategic ambiguity, the Framers assumed that such disagreements,
by shared tacit understanding at the Convention, would be worked
out in the course of ordinary politics after ratification.326 The
General Welfare Clause has all the hallmarks of a strategically
ambiguous clause designed to work a compromise among differing
views.327
The broad outlines of a three-way compromise comprehending the
three issues—a taxing purpose proviso, debt assumption, and
national legislative power—emerged with the second Committee of
Detail report on August 22. That report included both a taxing
purpose clause and a revised Necessary and Proper Clause that was
clarified and strengthened by adding a general welfare power to
324. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 5.
325. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 1; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 417
(Madison) (stating that Madison “thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that
there could be property in men”).
326. Hills, supra note 16, at 4-8.
327. When the Convention records show that a controversial issue was addressed by a
committee whose recommendation was subsequently approved unanimously, or nearly so,
without debate, that is strong circumstantial evidence of a compromise. Such was the
situation with the General Welfare Clause on September 4. Meeting from 10:00 AM to 3:00
or 4:00 PM every day but Sunday, living in a few boardinghouses within just a few city blocks
of the Convention hall, and dining together in groups more often than not, the delegates had
ample opportunity to communicate off the Convention floor. See BEEMAN, supra note 210, at
304-05. Compromise resolutions in committee could easily have been conveyed to the
Convention as a whole before being voted on, and even before being formally reported.
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it.328 That general welfare clause provision also included language
from the original Resolution 6, as well as from Sherman’s “state
internal police” motion.329 Wilson was probably the prime mover
behind this language. Wilson was apparently willing to accept the
addition of a purpose proviso to the Taxing Clause and a state police
power reservation to the Necessary and Proper Clause in exchange
for a General Welfare Clause that would plainly restore the general
authorization to legislate—as the Bedford Resolution of July 17 had
put it—“in all cases for the general interests of the Union.”330 The
compromise offered Sherman two concessions (taxing purpose and
state police powers) and Wilson one (general welfare legislative
power). But a power to pay the Revolutionary War debt (Morris’s
concern) was left merely implicit in the taxing purpose proviso in
the August 22 Committee of Detail report.331
It is implausible that on September 4, the Convention unanimously, and without discussion, agreed to tack on an unambiguously limiting “purpose clause” to the taxing power. That intention
had been put forward without success three times during the
proceedings. Each of these used unambiguous language to describe
debt-paying as the purpose of federal taxation. Randolph’s revised
draft for the August 6 Committee of Detail report, and the August
22 Committee of Detail report, each set out purpose provisos: a
taxing power “for ... debts and necessities of the union”332 and, later,
“for payment of the debts and necessary expences of the United
States.”333 Neither of these “tax purpose” provisos ever reached a
floor vote.334 Sherman’s motion offered a broader range of permissible expenditures, but retained the word “for” to render debt-paying
a qualification of the taxing power rather than a separate grant of
power.335 It was decisively rejected by a 1-10 vote.336 It is not credible
that the Committee on Postponed Parts would then, just two weeks
later, reintroduce a clause meant to be identical to what was
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 366-67 (Journal).
See supra text accompanying notes 216-24.
2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 21 (Journal).
See id. at 369.
Id. at 142 (Committee of Detail Report).
Id. at 366 (Journal) (emphasis added).
See id. at 142 (Committee of Detail Report), 366-69 (Journal).
Id. at 327 (Madison).
Id. at 412 (Madison).
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rejected, and that the Convention would approve it unanimously
without discussion. Those who rejected Sherman’s proposal would,
far more plausibly, have demanded concessions or reassurances to
reconsider it.
It is also doubtful that the General Welfare Clause that first
appeared on August 22 as a proposed addition to the Necessary and
Proper Clause simply died in silence. There would be little point in
moving the “general interest/welfare” language to Clause 1 if the
intention was unambiguously to delete it. The only point in
retaining the General Welfare Clause anywhere would be to mollify
its original proponents in some way. To be sure, the General
Welfare Clause’s final wording opened competing, narrow interpretations. But the general welfare interpretation was still more
linguistically plausible than its competitors, as Madison would later
admit.337
Finally, the phrase “to pay the Debts” must still be accounted for.
As suggested above, the argument that this must be read as a
purpose proviso—“in order to pay the debts”—requires explaining
why the Convention would, within the space of two weeks and with
no discussion, have changed from a 1-10 rejection to an 11-0
approval of a tax-purpose limitation. But if “to pay the Debts” is a
grant of power, then so is “and provide ... for the common Defence
and general Welfare.”
The most likely explanation is that the power “to pay the Debts”
resulted from an intertwined element of a general welfare compromise. There was no need to specify a generic debt-paying power,
which was implicit in the power to borrow.338 To nationalists, the
only appeal of adding “to pay the Debts” was to permit debt
assumption legislation: it would help assumption advocates in
future debates to fend off the argument that assuming state debts
was unconstitutional. To be sure, the initial impulse to constitutionalize an obligation or even an express authorization to assume
state debts was whittled down to a vague authorization. Nevertheless, the reason the clause is in Article I, Section 8 is that the issue
was of prime importance to the Framers—so important that they
337. See supra text accompanying notes 82-89.
338. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. A government’s obtaining money with no
intention of repaying it is either taxing, which was already provided for, or mooching, which
the Framers disdained. See BRANT, supra note 151, at 306-07.
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nearly listed it as the first enumerated power. The language of the
Debt Clause was moved around and watered down; earlier versions
of it had made clear that the debt in question was the Revolutionary
War debt, made repayment obligatory, and authorized federal
assumption of state debts.339 The watering down was primarily to
make the power discretionary and to beg the question of assumption. Nevertheless, the delegates apparently understood the Debt
Clause to refer specifically to a power to pay the Revolutionary War
debt.340 Madison confirmed this in later years, as did Hamilton, who
also indicated that the change was a strategic ambiguity.341
Viewed in this light, the final version of Clause 1, proposed by the
Committee on Postponed Parts on September 4, bears the unmistakable outlines of further progress on this three-way compromise.
Moving the General Welfare Clause from the end of the enumeration to the beginning retained its function as a broad legislative
authorization. Either a general authorization at the start of a list or
a sweeping clause at the end could signal an intention to negate an
inference of an exhaustive enumeration of powers. The enumeration
now had both. The Committee of Style, led by Morris (with the
likely input of Wilson) strengthened the endorsement of introductory “general welfare” language by drafting a preamble with that
phrase.342 To be sure, the general welfare language was packaged in
a manner that could arguably be reduced to a mere taxing purpose
proviso; to further this interpretation, its language was modified
slightly to resemble Article VIII of the Articles of Confederation,

339. See supra text accompanying notes 250-58.
340. See supra notes 250-58 and accompanying text.
341. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 392 (Madison); Madison to Stevenson, supra note
3, at 418 (noting the General Welfare Clause was a “provision for the debts of the Revolution”). Hamilton recalled “a long conversation, which [he] had with Mr. Madison in an
afternoon’s walk,” during the Convention in which he and Madison “perfectly agreed in the
expediency and propriety” of federal assumption of state debts, but further agreed “that it
would be more adviseable to make it a measure of administration than an article of
constitution” to minimize objections to ratification. From Alexander Hamilton to Edward
Carrington, 26 May 1792, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Hamilton/01-11-02-0349 [https://perma.cc/GU7W-QC94].
342. See Treanor, supra note 110, at 4-6 (explaining that Morris and Committee of Style
drafted the preamble). Although not formally a member of the Committee of Style, James
Wilson may also have had a hand in drafting the preamble. See WARREN, supra note 13, at
687-88 (arguing that Wilson is “equally, if not more, entitled to the honor of making this final
draft”).
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dealing with reimbursement of state expenditures “for the common
defence or general welfare.”343 An express power (not obligation) to
“pay the debts” (not assume the state Revolutionary War debts) was
likewise presented in a way that could be read as a grant of power
or a taxing purpose. The weakening and ambiguating of all three
strands of the compromise—obligatory repayment and assumption,
broad taxing power, and general power to legislate on all national
matters— would give room to Roger Sherman and others to argue
that the enumeration was exhaustive and limiting, and that the
General Welfare Clause merely identified the purposes for which
taxes could be raised.
To be clear, I do not argue that the “General Welfare Compromise” was a deal among only Wilson, Morris, and Sherman.344 I do
suggest that they are the most likely architects given their roles in
making motions and serving on the three most relevant committees
(Detail, Postponed Parts, and Style). But they undoubtedly represented opinions shared by blocs of delegates. For example, we can
see indications in the records that John Rutledge favored a purpose
clause appended to the taxing power,345 that Charles Pinckney
seconded Morris’s proposal for a cabinet secretary to “attend to”
national police power matters,346 and that Wilson would likely have
needed support from Committee of Detail colleagues Ellsworth and
Nathaniel Gorham to get his two versions of the Necessary and
Proper Clause into the Committee reports of August 6 and August
22.347 Pierce Butler of South Carolina was opposed to debt assumption and unenumerated powers; he sat on the Committee on
Postponed Parts and may have needed assuaging to overcome his
likely opposition to the Committee report.348
We should pause to consider James Madison’s role in the general
welfare compromise, if only because of his (grossly exaggerated but
persistent) reputation as principal architect of the Constitution.349
Although he sat on both the Committees of Postponed Parts and
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

See BRANT, supra note 151, at 135-38; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. VIII.
See BRANT, supra note 151, at 133-39 (suggesting others possibly involved).
See supra text accompanying note 169.
See supra text accompanying note 237.
See supra text accompanying note 232.
See supra text accompanying note 258.
See Schwartz & Mikhail, supra note 128, at 2034-35.
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Style, Madison had expressed no strong views on any of the three
issues involved in the compromise: he refrained from committing
himself on enumerationism,350 and made no speeches on the Bedford
resolution, the debt assumption question, or Sherman’s motion to
include a taxing purpose proviso.351 Notwithstanding his later
aversion to the General Welfare Clause, Madison gave no indication
in his notes of an objection to it at the Convention. Having “proven
his value in improving language and sidestepping controversy,”352
Madison is likely to have played a role in crafting the compromise
language of the General Welfare Clause.
B. A Textual Victory for the General Welfare Power
The compromise notwithstanding, Morris and Wilson could well
have come away from the bargain believing they had gotten the
better end of it, by retaining, and in some ways strengthening,
language whose literal meaning was to authorize a power to
legislate for the general welfare. The shift of the General Welfare
Clause from the Necessary and Proper Clause to the Taxing Clause,
and its rewording, made the final General Welfare Clause at once
weaker and stronger than the August 22 version. As an add-on to
the Necessary and Proper Clause, it had been a virtually unmistakable grant of legislative power. But its new placement at the end of
the Taxing Clause increased the prospects of giving it a weaker
reading as a non-grant of power. On the other hand, the states’rights-protective language from the August 22 version, establishing
noninterference with state police powers, was dropped. And the
revised version clarified the somewhat convoluted wording of the
August 22 version: the legislative power was no longer mixed up
with a power to manage federal property.353
Reading Clause 1 with the interpretive canons, Wilson and Morris could well have believed that they had placed the general welfare
interpretation on a much stronger footing than any narrower interpretation. To begin with, merely placing the General Welfare
Clause in Clause 1 strengthened it by creating the general-specific
350.
351.
352.
353.

See supra text accompanying note 144.
2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 26-27, 377, 412-15 (Madison).
See BILDER, supra note 9, at 141.
The provision was moved into Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2.
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pattern known to favor a broad construction of the general term
and a non-exhaustive interpretation of the specifics.354 Moreover,
as discussed above, the Committee of Style’s revised preamble supports the general welfare interpretation for two reasons, both of
which would have been readily apparent to trained and sophisticated lawyers like Wilson and Morris. First, the preamble clarified
that the ends of the new national government included “provid[ing]
for the common defence [and] promot[ing] the general Welfare.”355
Because “[n]o axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason,
than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized,”356 a power to legislate for the general welfare would be a
reasonable means to accomplish the stated purposes of the preamble. Second, Wilson and Morris would have been familiar with
Blackstone’s maxim that ambiguous terms can be clarified by
reference to the preamble.357 As a textual matter, the strategically
ambiguous final version of Clause 1 would thus tilt heavily toward
the general welfare interpretation.
The compromise worked to an extent—both sides argued that
their interpretation had prevailed. Although Mason continued to
object to “the general clause, at the end of the enumerated powers”
and opposed ratification on that basis,358 Roger Sherman declared
victory. In a post-Convention debriefing letter to the governor of
Connecticut, Sherman and his co-delegate Oliver Ellsworth
announced the enumerationist interpretation of Article I, Section 8
as a whole, and Clause 1 in particular.359 The powers of Congress
“extend only to matters respecting the common interests of the
union, and are specially defined,” they asserted.360 Moreover, “[t]he
objects, for which congress may apply monies, are the same
mentioned in the eighth article of the confederation, viz. for the
common defence and general welfare, and for payment of the debts

See supra Part II.B.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (Madison), supra note 41, at 285.
See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 637, 640 (Mason); PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE
PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 86-89 (2010).
359. 3 FARRAND, supra note 201, at 99-100 (Sept. 26, 1787) (Roger Sherman and Oliver
Ellsworth to the Governor of Connecticut).
360. Id. at 99.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
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incurred for those purposes.”361 Asserting that these tendentious
interpretations were settled by the Constitution’s text was disingenuous and self-serving.
For his part, Gouverneur Morris asserted the general welfare interpretation. On September 6, Maryland delegate James McHenry,
who took sporadic notes throughout the Convention, recorded a revealing conversation with Morris outside the Convention room.362
McHenry, concerned for his Baltimore shipping constituents, had
floated the idea “to insert a power in the confederation [sic] enabling
the legislature to erect piers for protection of shipping in winter and
to preserve the navigation of harbours.”363 Morris, according to
McHenry, “thinks it may be done under the words of the 1 clause of
the 1 sect 7 art. amended—‘and provide for the common defence and
general welfare.[’]—If this comprehends such a power, it goes to
authorize the legisl[ature] to grant exclusive privileges to trading
companies etc.”364 It is not clear whether the “exclusive privileges”
comment is Morris’s or McHenry’s. Whoever said it was acknowledging two things: first, that the General Welfare Clause was indeed a
separate grant of power; and second, that a General Welfare Clause
that could improve harbors was a General Welfare Clause that
could create monopolies—a regulatory power.365
C. The Spending Power Interpretation as an Afterthought
What is missing from this historical reconstruction of a general
welfare compromise is the spending power interpretation. But that
is simply because there is no evidence that anyone advocated an
express spending power at the Convention. The word “spend” (as in
“spend money”) does not appear anywhere in Madison’s notes or the
Convention Journal; the word “provide” nowhere unambiguously
appears in the sense of “spend” either.366 Indeed, the Convention
361. Id.
362. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 529-30 (McHenry).
363. Id. at 529 (McHenry).
364. Id. at 529-30 (McHenry).
365. Forrest McDonald and William Treanor attribute the comment to McHenry, and
McDonald suggests that McHenry was “horrified” at the implication. MCDONALD, supra note
210, at 265; Treanor, supra note 110, at 22-23. As McHenry’s quoted notes neither suggest
horror nor clarify the speaker, these surmises are speculative.
366. These two claims are confirmed by word searches of a searchable PDF version of
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delegates never even discussed any such thing as an enumerated
“spending power.” The word used by the delegates to refer to the
application of money by the national government was not “spend,”
but “appropriate.”367 Moreover, the two provisions in the Constitution dealing with appropriations both impose limits on
spending.368 Proposals to limit appropriations were made on July 5
and August 18, without any provision granting an affirmative power
to spend having been proposed or discussed.369 Indeed, the language
that we now call the “spending power” was not proposed until
September 4.370 The Committee of Detail’s first draft of the enumerated powers on August 6 did not contain a “spending power.” That
draft did, however, include a version of the July 5 motion to limit
spending: “All bills for raising or appropriating money ... shall
originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered
or amended by the Senate.”371 Note that the phrase “raising or
appropriating” is not a redundant doublet, but rather two separate
concepts, parallel to “taxing or spending.” Money coming into the
Treasury was “raised”; money going out, or earmarked for going out,
was “appropriated.”372
The fact that the delegates debated and approved restrictions on
spending before even purportedly proposing to grant a “spending
power” strongly suggests that a spending power was simply
assumed all along to be implicit in the power to legislate. An implied
volumes 1 (Journal) and 3 (Madison’s notes) of the Documentary History of the Constitution.
See 1 FARRAND, supra note 128; 3 FARRAND, supra note 201.
367. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. See generally Kesavan & Paulsen, supra
note 51, at 1198 (advocating “first-best use of” the Convention records “as an extratextual
dictionary of constitutional meaning”).
368. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12; § 9, cl. 7.
369. 1 FARRAND, supra note 128, at 524-25 (Journal) (July 5 proposal); 2 FARRAND, supra
note 12, at 322 (Journal) (August 18 proposal) (“Funds ... appropriated for payment of public
Creditors shall not ... be diverted or applied to any other purpose.”).
370. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 493 (Journal).
371. Id. at 178 (Madison). The Convention initially struck out this House-appropriations
provision, id. at 224-25 (Madison), but ultimately restored it, albeit split into two parts.
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution now begins: “All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The “appropriations” part was moved
into Article I, Section 9, and effectively transmogrified from a limitation on the Senate to a
limitation on the Executive: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
372. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
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spending power would not have been the only instance of a legislative power that is assumed by the Constitution and only evidenced
by restrictive or prohibitory language: the powers to suspend habeas
corpus, to grant titles of nobility, and—later, in the Fifth Amendment—to take property by eminent domain are three other such
examples.373 Madison no doubt captured the sense of the Convention
when he stated in 1800 that there is not “a power of any magnitude,
which, in its exercise, does not involve or admit an application of
money.”374
Given that a power to spend money was referred to as “appropriation” and was taken as implicit until at least September 4, when
the “provide for the common defense and general welfare” language
first appeared, proponents of the spending power interpretation
have some explaining to do.375 Why would a spending power, having
been assumed all along as an implied power, be added so late in the
day, and only under the highly ambiguous, indeed misleading, word
“provide”? The Convention records supply no explanation. If there
was a body of opinion within the Convention that called for an
enumerated spending power, it was unexpressed—and therefore
unlikely. A more likely explanation is that the spending power
interpretation did not even arise until the ratification debates or
later. The first definitive spending power interpretation was offered
by Hamilton in his 1791 Report on Manufactures.376 If there had
been a consensus to make the General Welfare Clause an unambiguous spending power, it seems likely that the committee drafters
would have used the word “appropriation” there as well: “To lay and
collect taxes ... [in order] to appropriate money for the common
defense and general welfare.” Using “provide for” would have
introduced an ambiguity that would have been pointless if the
intention were only to express a spending power.

373. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cls. 2, 8; id. amend. V.
374. See Madison, Virginia Report, supra note 62, at 356. Madison at times failed to
distinguish the concepts of “raising” and “appropriating,” either from confusion or to mislead
his readers. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 41, at 263 (Madison) (construing “provide”
to mean “raise money”); Madison to Stevenson, supra note 3, at 424-28 (using “appropriate”
to mean “raise money”).
375. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 493 (Journal).
376. See Hamilton, supra note 66, at 302-03.
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D. Immaterial Style-Based Inferences
Over the years, it has been argued that small matters of style,
punctuation, or sentence structure can clear up the ambiguity built
into Clause 1 and dispositively negate the general welfare interpretation. They do not.
1. The Sinister Semicolon
The most enduring style-based argument stems from the probably
apocryphal story that Gouverneur Morris on the Committee of Style
tried to defraud the Convention by substituting a semicolon for a
comma immediately before “to pay the Debts,” thereby illicitly
creating a general welfare interpretation by beefing up the grammatical separation between the Taxing Clause and the “Spending”
Clause (or the tax purpose proviso, depending on one’s favored
interpretation). But as the story goes, Roger Sherman caught the
subterfuge at the last minute, and the comma was restored.377
Although numerous historians have perpetuated (or at least
repeated) this tale,378 the story is most likely a 220-year-old urban
myth. Originating in a vague account during a 1798 congressional
speech,379 the tale completely lacks documentary support aside from
the punctuation itself: the Convention Journal shows a comma in
that spot in the approved September 4 version reported by the
Committee on Postponed Parts, a semicolon in the September 12
Committee of Style report, and a comma again in what is generally
accepted as the final version of the Constitution approved by the
Convention.380

377. See, e.g., MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
182-83 (1913).
378. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 210, at 265 (accepting the story at face value);
Treanor, supra note 110, at 37-41 (same); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West
Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 338-39 (2002) (accepting the story, but
questioning its interpretive relevance); Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, Our Forgotten
Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 286 n.25 (1987) (same).
379. See 3 FARRAND, supra note 201, at 379 (June 19, 1798) (speech of Albert Gallatin).
380. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 493 (Journal), 594 (Committee of Style Report), 655
(engrossed Constitution).
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But to view the comma as “original” or “authentic” is a distortion.381 Significantly, the first written version of Clause 1 that all
the delegates would have seen was the September 12 Committee of
Style report, which was printed and distributed to the delegates on
September 13.382 Other than that report, and the August 6 Committee of Detail report, both of which were printed and distributed as
typeset broadsides, the delegates did not see committee reports—those were handwritten and read aloud rather than copied
and distributed.383 So when the delegates approved the September
4 version of Clause 1, they did so based on hearing, rather than
reading it. When the Convention approved the final Constitution,
they did so based on their own printed copies of the Committee of
Style draft with whatever interlineations they made based on the
emendations approved from September 13 to 15.384 Few, if any,
delegates would have seen a version with the comma rather than
the semicolon before signing the Constitution.385 It is inconceivable
381. To begin with, our only record of the text of this report is Secretary Jackson’s copying
of it into the Convention Journal. Given the inattention to punctuation niceties by Jackson
and all of the Convention hand-writers, it is certainly conceivable that the comma was a
transcription error. See David S. Schwartz & Nicholas Brock Enger, The Sinister Semicolon:
On Parsing Punctuation in the Constitution (manuscript on file with author). The original
handwritten committee reports are lost to history, evidently being among “the loose scraps
of paper” that were burned by Jackson on September 17. See 3 FARRAND, supra note 201, at
82 (Appendix). In contrast to the August 6 Committee of Detail report and the September 1213 Committee of Style report, both of which were professionally printed and distributed to the
delegates, none of the other handwritten committee reports have been found among any of the
delegates’ papers.
382. 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 582 (Journal, Sept. 12) (“ordered that the Members be
furnished with printed copies thereof”); id. at 609 (McHenry, Sept. 13) (“Recd. read and
compared the new printed report”).
383. The September 4 report of the Committee on Postponed Parts was read aloud by
Committee Chair Brearley “in his place”—that is, from his seat on the Convention floor and
“was afterwards delivered in at the Secretary’s table—and was again read” by Secretary
Jackson. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 493 (Journal). Jackson used passive voice when
he read committee reports aloud. See id. at 366 (noting that Committee of Detail Chair
Rutledge “read the report in his place—and the same, being delivered in at the Secretary’s
table, was again read”).
384. See id. at 609-10 (Journal), 614-15 (Madison).
385. The September 4 report was an extremely long one, in which the General Welfare
Clause was followed by seven lengthy sections on the powers and election of the president. See
id. at 493-95 (Journal), 496-99 (Madison). The delegates quickly and unanimously approved
the Committee’s proposed version of the General Welfare Clause based on the oral reading,
with no debate recorded by Madison. The delegates then proceeded to debate the latter
clauses. When the debate proved inconclusive on the presidential clauses, the delegates voted
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that any delegate, let alone a majority, proofread the approximately
4,500 words and hundreds of punctuation marks in the engrossed
(handwritten) parchment Constitution in the fleeting moment on
September 17 that each stood, one after the other, at the secretary’s
table to sign the document. What the delegates did see, and
approve, was the September 12-13 Committee of Style broadside,
with the semicolon.386 So, if there was any “punctuation fraud,” it
was in replacing the Committee of Style’s semicolon with a
comma—rather than the reverse.
But we need not resolve the mystery of the semicolon here,
because the comma does not weaken the case for the general welfare
interpretation. When Article I, Section 8 enumerates multiple
powers in a single clause, those powers are invariably set off by
commas, not semicolons—even in the lengthy and tortuous Seat of
Government Clause, where a semicolon might help the reader pause
for breath.387 Moreover, the presence of the comma before “to pay
the Debts” has a double-edge, weakening the Jeffersonian purpose
interpretation compared with the same wording without any
punctation mark.388 Slyly perhaps, Jefferson himself rendered this
piece of text without a comma when arguing his interpretation to
President Washington.389 Note the absence of any punctuation in the
pertinent spot in both Jefferson’s (mis)quotation of the clause and
his interpretation of it: “‘To lay taxes to provide for the general
welfare of the U.S.’ that is to say ‘to lay taxes for the purpose of
providing for the general welfare’.”390 As Kesavan and Paulsen

to postpone further consideration in order to allow members to make copies of that portion
of the report for themselves. See id. at 496, 502 (Madison). Those delegates who chose to copy
the report for themselves could in theory have seen the comma—if it was a comma—but by
then, having already approved the General Welfare Clause, their focus would have been on
the numerous lengthy paragraphs on the presidency. Id. at 597-600 (Committee of Style
Report). The notion that some critical mass of delegates would have seen the comma,
attributed decisive significance to it, transcribed it carefully into their own handwritten copy
of the September 4 report, and then failed to note the semicolon in the September 12-13
Committee of Style broadside, is implausible.
386. See id. at 594 (Committee of Style Report).
387. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5 (“To coin ..., regulate ..., and fix”); id. cl. 11 (“To declare
..., grant ..., and make”); id. cl. 17 (“To exercise ..., and to exercise”).
388. See id. cl. 1.
389. See Jefferson, supra note 74, at 275-80.
390. See id. at 277; see also CONST. OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA of 1861, art.
I, § 8, cl. 1 (Mar. 11, 1861) (having no comma between “excises” and “for revenue”).
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observe, “misquoting constitutional text” signals “a desperate
interpreter.”391
Historically, the comma argument does indeed seem like a
desperate ploy to evade what Madison saw as the Clause’s literal
meaning. Madison later wrote that the punctuation issue did not
deserve “the weight of a feather” in interpreting the General
Welfare Clause.392 Perhaps the most damning argument against the
significance of the semicolon is Professor Crosskey’s commonsense
observation: “As the repunctuated clause is still undeniably open to
[the general welfare] interpretation as a mere matter of English,”
the reinsertion of the comma as “the method chosen by the skilled
lawyers of the Federal Convention” to negate that interpretation
would have been “singularly inept and ineffective.”393 At most, the
purported semicolon-comma switch offers a cautionary tale against
deciding a fundamental constitutional debate over the scope of
legislative power by the vagaries of late eighteenth-century midsentence punctuation.394
2. Sentence Structure
Another exceedingly weak argument against the general welfare
interpretation arises from the sentence structure of Clause 1.
Specifically, the placement of the “tax uniformity” restriction at the
end of Clause 1 has convinced some scholars that the entire clause
must be limited to taxing, or at least to revenue.395 But this is
391. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 378, at 350.
392. Madison to Stevenson, supra note 3, at 412 n.2, 414 n.2 (“Memorandum not used in
letter to Mr. Stevenson.”).
393. 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 110, at 394; accord Amar, supra note 378, at 286 n.25
(doubting the interpretive significance of the semicolon versus comma distinction); Kesavan
& Paulsen, supra note 378, at 339 n.151 (same).
394. The difference in meaning between the two punctuation marks was even less
pronounced in the eighteenth century than it is now. It is even possible that the punctuation
marks in question were made at the discretion of the Convention’s printer and engrosser,
rather than by any of the delegates. See Schwartz & Enger, supra note 381.
395. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“[B]ut all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.”); see, e.g., Natelson, supra note 19, at 14. Natelson
categorically rejects a reading that “grants an authority to tax, then grants an authority to
spend, then doubles back to restrict the authority to tax” because such a reading “imports into
the Constitution a stylistic awkwardness very uncharacteristic of that elegantly-drawn
document.” Id. This “inference from elegance,” aside from being premised on a debatable
aesthetic judgment, overlooks the nature of a group drafting project by a few dozen
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wrong, both as a matter of syntax and drafting history. To begin
with, the argument assumes that the uniformity proviso was
carefully integrated into Clause 1 to affect the meaning of the debtpaying or General Welfare Clauses in some way. It was not. First
proposed on August 25, the uniformity proviso had no connection to
Clause 1 or the committees that drafted the final version of Clause
1; it had been drafted by an entirely different eleven-member
committee.396 When this language was agreed to on August 31, it
had no specific location and seemed destined for the section that
ultimately became Article I, Section 9.397 But for reasons unknown,
it was omitted from the Committee of Style draft,398 and was
subsequently tacked on at the end of Clause 1 on September 14,
three days before the end of the Convention.399 It could as well have
been included in Section 9 with the other taxing restrictions, and no
inference can fairly be drawn from its Clause 1 placement without
further evidence.400 Indeed, on two other occasions, restrictive
provisions were added to the Taxing Clause only to be relocated to
Section 9.401 It is probable that the uniformity proviso would have
gone the same way had it been inserted before, rather than after,
the Committee of Style revisions.
In any case, nothing about English grammar requires that
clauses of limitation immediately follow the matter to be limited,
with no intervening subject matter. Nor does constitutional “style”
support such an interpretive rule.402 Indeed, three of the four
restrictions on federal taxing power are found in Article I, Section
contentious men eager to get home. And though Natelson identifies as a public meaning
originalist, this particular argument is premised on drafters’ intentions—their purported
conscious attention to style.
396. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 410 (Journal).
397. Id. at 480 (Madison) (approving tax uniformity and port preference language as
amendments to Article VII, Section 4 of the Committee of Detail draft).
398. See id. at 594-96 (Committee of Style Report).
399. See id. at 610 (Journal), 614 (Madison).
400. See id. The reasons for placing it in Clause 1—and whether that was even done by
motion, as opposed to a scrivener’s correction—are not recorded either in the Journal or by
Madison. See id. at 610 (Journal), 612-19 (Madison). In his later revision of his notes, Madison
merely quoted the provision and wrote that it “was unanimously annexed to the power of
taxation.” Id. at 614 (Madison).
401. Id. at 303 (Journal) (showing the export tax prohibition moved into Article I, Section
9, clause 5); id. at 366-67 (Journal) (showing the clause limiting “permanent revenue” moved
into Article I, Section 9, clause 7).
402. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 110, at 395-96.
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9, far apart from the Taxing Clause,403 and restrictive provisions are
somewhat haphazardly distributed between Sections 8 and 9.404
3. Prepositions
Finally, some scholars have tried to eliminate the plausibility of
the general welfare interpretation by drawing excessive substantive
inferences from fine points of preposition use. But these arguments
cannot bear the interpretive weight they are assigned to carry. Most
power grants in Section 8 begin with a complete infinitive verb, with
the word “to,”405 but Section 8 usually resorts to compound infinitives, granting multiple powers with “to” implied: “To coin ...,
regulate ..., and fix”; “To declare War, grant Letters of Marque ...,
and make Rules.”406 The Committee of Detail did not use compound
infinitives in its enumeration, instead listing each grant of power
with a single infinitive verb on a separate line.407 Compound
infinitives may have been a thing with Gouverneur Morris. The
Committee of Style introduced several compound infinitives, both
when grouping certain comparable powers in Article I, Section 8,
and in the preamble: “to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty.”408 But that style is not consistent in Article I, Section 8,
apart from Clause 1.409 Clause 17 provides: “To exercise exclusive
Legislation ..., and to exercise like Authority.”410
The most likely explanation for the grammar of Clause 1 is that
“to pay ... and provide” was a compound infinitive signifying two
powers, just like all the other compound infinitives in Article I,

403. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (limiting tax on imported slaves to ten dollars per
person); id. cl. 4 (imposing census requirement on direct taxes); id. cl. 5 (prohibiting federal
export taxes).
404. Restrictive clauses are found in Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1, 12 (“but no
Appropriation of Money”), and 16 (“reserving to the States respectively”). See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cls. 1, 12, 16.
405. See id. art. I, § 8.
406. See id. cls. 5, 11 (emphasis added).
407. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 177-89 (Madison).
408. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
409. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
410. Id. cl. 17 (emphasis added).
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Section 8.411 When the Debt and General Welfare Clauses were
added to the Taxing Clause, however, it probably escaped notice
that “pay” and “provide” could, for stylistic consistency, have been
compounded with “[t]o lay and collect,” merely by deleting “to”
before “pay” and adding an Oxford comma after “debts.”412 Instead,
rather than deleting the word “to” in front of pay, the Committee of
Style draft added a semicolon.413 The Committee of Style draft also
changed all the semicolons at the end of each enumerated power
clause to periods.414 For unknown reasons, these periods were
restored to semicolons after the September 15 vote approving the
Committee of Style draft, and the semicolon before “to pay the
debts” was changed to a comma.415
Such is the nature of group drafting projects, especially in the
Constitutional Convention, where the group diverged on many key
points and finished its work in a rush.416 In his speech opposing the
first Bank of the United States, Madison offered a candid acknowledgement of the limitations of an inferential textual interpretation
of the Constitution: “It is not pretended that every insertion or
omission in the Constitution is the effect of systematic attention.”417
Those who rely on prepositions and comma placements to assert
dispositive resolution of such great and contested questions as the
scope of federal powers would do well to avoid such pretenses.
CONCLUSION
The General Welfare Clause was initially drafted to authorize the
federal government to address all national problems. Due to a
compromise, it was rewritten in a strategically ambiguous manner
to accommodate an alternative, narrower “taxing purpose” interpretation. Yet the final version of the General Welfare Clause favored
the broad general welfare interpretation, whereas the taxing
purpose interpretation was arguable, but less plausible.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

See id. cl. 1.
See id.
See 2 FARRAND, supra note 12, at 594-96 (Committee of Style Report).
See id.
See id. at 655-56 (engrossed Constitution).
See id. at 493-97 (Journal) (illustrating the delegates’ quick approval).
2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1899 (1791) (emphasis added).
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After ratification, two additional, linguistically plausible
“spending power” interpretations emerged that had not been
contemplated by the Framers—the “Madisonian” and “Hamiltonian”
interpretations. Eventually, the constitutional order settled on the
Hamiltonian “non-regulatory spending” interpretation as the result
of a political compromise brokered by President James Monroe to
accommodate the nationalist wing of his dominant Republican
coalition. Eventually, the two interpretations contemplated by the
Framers—the Jeffersonian and general welfare versions—faded
from history, leading modern scholars to assume that they had
never been taken seriously. This interpretive journey is a story in
itself that I take up elsewhere.418
The conventional interpretation of the General Welfare Clause as
the Spending Clause runs counter to its text and drafting history.
Only by assuming that the enumeration of powers must be interpreted as limiting can we justify the choice of the spending power
over the general welfare interpretation as a matter of text or
drafters’ intent. But the origins of the General Welfare Clause
demonstrate that an enumerationist interpretation of the Constitution is not compelled by the text or drafting history of the enumerated powers.
If, as I have argued, the Framers’ intentions and the text of the
Constitution do not foreclose, and indeed support, the general
welfare interpretation—that the General Welfare Clause authorizes
Congress to legislate on all national problems—the implications are
far-reaching. This would mean that enumerationism is not the
inexorable constitutional command that is normally associated with
clear-cut textual or intent-based arguments—whether those arguments are made by originalists or non-originalists. The argument
for enumerationism would necessarily be shifted into modes of
constitutional argument dependent on policy and values.
Enumerationists would have to explain what values are served by
disabling the federal government from addressing national problems
that the states collectively have proven unwilling or unable to solve,
such as environmental degradation or a pandemic. The constitutional debate over laws like the Violence Against Women Act
would address federalism concerns head-on, by discussing whether
418. See Schwartz, supra note 68.
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gender-motivated violence is a national or local problem, rather
than focusing on the tangential—indeed, absurd—question of
whether it is “commerce.” By freeing constitutional interpretation
from the dubious given of limited enumerated powers, we can get to
the heart of federalism questions. If we are to “lament” the federal
government’s constitutional debarment from addressing one or more
of our pressing national problems, our constitutional discourse
would finally allow us to ask directly whether a particular federalism limitation is worth the price, and indeed, whether such debarment serves any “federalism” values at all.

